TEXAS OVERVIEW OF STATE RESPONSE TO CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION April 2019 a Review
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Submitted to: North American Deer Farmer Publication Type: Trade Journal Publication Acceptance Date: 7/1/2022 Publication Date: 7/20/2022 Citation: Cassmann, E.D., Greenlee, J.J. 2022. Exploring the possibility of CWD transmission through artificial insemination of semen from CWD positive bucks. North American Deer Farmer. p. 107-109. Interpretive Summary: Technical Abstract: Artificial insemination is a popular method for herd management and reproduction in the cervid farming industry. There are numerous benefits including increased access to superior genetics, convenience, and increased farm revenue. In this article, we summarize the research that is underway to determine if semen from a CWD infected buck can transmit the disease. Some research has already been performed on the reproductive transmission of CWD in cervids. Scientists from Colorado State University used Muntjac deer to demonstrate that CWD positive does could transmit CWD to their fawns (1). In the study, Muntjac does were bred to CWD negative bucks. At the time of breeding, does were either in the early or late stage of CWD infection. Fawns from both doe groups were positive for CWD. More recent laboratory experiments on semen from CWD positive bucks have demonstrated the presence of CWD prions (2). Researchers used an amplification technique called PMCA (protein misfolding cyclic amplification). The technique amplifies low levels of CWD prions to a point where conventional antibody methods can detect them. The caveat to the discovery of CWD prions in semen is that we’re unsure if the amount of CWD prions in semen is biologically relevant. In other words, is the level of CWD prions in semen sufficient to be infectious and cause disease in deer? In our present study, we are trying to answer that question. We obtained semen from a CWD positive buck. The semen was confirmed to be PMCA positive. For the study, we used the transcervical insemination method in three does. As of June 19th, a single fawn was born. Shortly after birth the fawn was separated to prevent environment CWD exposure. We are assessing both the does and the fawn for the development of CWD. The experiment is expected to last several years, and periodic sampling will help monitor progress. A second phase of the study will investigate the absolute susceptibility of white-tailed deer does to CWD after transcervical and/or vaginal exposure to large amounts of CWD prions. We plan to expose two does to brain suspension from a CWD positive deer. These does will also be monitored long term for the development of disease. If these does remain negative, it would indicate that CWD transmission to the dam is highly unlikely via reproductive tract exposure. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 2019 In Vitro detection of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) prions in semen and reproductive tissues of white tailed deer bucks (Odocoileus virginianus TEXAS CWD, Have you been ThunderStruck, deer semen, straw bred bucks, super ovulation, and the potential TSE Prion connection, what if? SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2020 ***> Jerking for Dollars, Are Texas Politicians and Legislators Masturbating Deer For Money, and likely spreading CWD TSE Prion? THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2014 supercalifragilisticexpialidocious or superovulationcwdtsepriondocious ? (It was noted with concern that hormone extracts could be manufactured by a veterinary surgeon for administration to animals under his care without any Medicines Act Control.) PITUITARY EXTRACT This was used to help cows super ovulate. *** This tissue was considered to be of greatest risk of containing BSE and consequently transmitting the disease. *** Proposed Amendments to CWD Zone Rules Your opinions and comments have been submitted successfully. Thank you for participating in the TPWD regulatory process. THURSDAY, AUGUST 04, 2022 Texas Proposed Amendments to CWD Zone Rules Singeltary Submission FRIDAY, APRIL 30, 2021 Should Property Evaluations Contain Scrapie, CWD, TSE PRION Environmental Contamination of the land? ***> Confidential!!!! ***> As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland. Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!! A very frightening revelation!!! ---end personal email---end...tss WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017 *** Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion aka Mad Deer Disease and the Real Estate Market Land Values *** MONDAY, MARCH 05, 2018 TRUCKING AROUND AND SPREADING CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION VIA MOVEMENT OF CERVID AND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2022 TAHC PROPOSES CHANGES TO VOLUNTARY CWD PROGRAM CHAPTER 40, CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE SINGELTARY SUBMISSION JUNE 28, 2022 ***> TEXAS HISTORY OF CWD <*** Singeltary telling TAHC, that CWD was waltzing into Texas from WSMR around Trans Pecos region, starting around 2001, 2002, and every year, there after, until New Mexico finally shamed TAHC et al to test where i had been telling them to test for a decade. 2012 cwd was detected first right there where i had been trying to tell TAHC for 10 years. ***> Singeltary on Texas Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion History <*** |
APHIS Indemnity Regulations [Docket No. APHIS-2021-0010] RIN 0579-AE65 Singeltary Comment SubmissionComment from Singeltary Sr., Terry
Posted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on Sep 8, 2022MAD COW FEED BAN AND CERVID FEED, WHAT IF?e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as"Do not feed to ruminants".VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tonsDISTRIBUTION AL and FLEND OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006Friday, December 14, 2012DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012snip...In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.snip...OIE atypical BSEGiven that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.OIE Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattleGiven that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.OIE Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 201934 Scientific Commission/September 20193. Atypical BSEThe Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greavessnip...REFERENCESSNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strainsOlivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author:‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.Prion Infectivity in Fat of Deer with Chronic Wasting Disease▿Brent Race#, Kimberly Meade-White#, Richard Race and Bruce Chesebro* + Author AffiliationsIn mice, prion infectivity was recently detected in fat. Since ruminant fat is consumed by humans and fed to animals, we determined infectivity titers in fat from two CWD-infected deer. Deer fat devoid of muscle contained low levels of CWD infectivity and might be a risk factor for prion infection of other species.Prions in Skeletal Muscles of Deer with Chronic Wasting DiseaseHere bioassays in transgenic mice expressing cervid prion protein revealed the presence of infectious prions in skeletal muscles of CWD-infected deer, demonstrating that humans consuming or handling meat from CWD-infected deer are at risk to prion exposure.Very low oral exposure to prions of brain or saliva origin can transmit chronic wasting diseaseNathaniel D. Denkers ,Clare E. Hoover ,Kristen A. Davenport,Davin M. Henderson,Erin E. McNulty,Amy V. Nalls,Candace K. Mathiason,Edward A. HooverPublished: August 20, 2020We report that oral exposure to as little as 300 nanograms (ng) of CWD-positive brain or to saliva containing seeding activity equivalent to 300 ng of CWD-positive brain, were sufficient to transmit CWD disease. This was true whether the inoculum was administered as a single bolus or divided as three weekly 100 ng exposures. However, when the 300 ng total dose was apportioned as 10, 30 ng doses delivered over 12 weeks, no infection occurred. While low-dose exposures to prions of brain or saliva origin prolonged the time from inoculation to first detection of infection, once infection was established, we observed no differences in disease pathogenesis. These studies suggest that the CWD minimum infectious dose approximates 100 to 300 ng CWD-positive brain (or saliva equivalent), and that CWD infection appears to conform more with a threshold than a cumulative dose dynamic.cwd scrapie pigs oral routes***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <******> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.CONFIDENTIALEXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHYLINE TO TAKE3. If questions on pharmaceuticals are raised at the Press conference, the suggested line to take is as follows:-"There are no medicinal products licensed for use on the market which make use of UK-derived porcine tissues with which any hypothetical “high risk" ‘might be associated. The results of the recent experimental work at the CSM will be carefully examined by the CSM‘s Working Group on spongiform encephalopathy at its next meeting.DO Hagger RM 1533 MT Ext 3201While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....Monday, November 14, 2022Prion Diseases in Dromedary Camels (CPD) 2022 Review***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primatesCorinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe DeslysSummary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.snip...BSE bovine brain inoculum100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mgPrimate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)PrPres biochemical detectionThe comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inoculaPublished online January 27, 2005It is clear that the designing scientists mustalso have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the doselevels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if oneconsiders that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that itcould take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within thesame species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate"experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experimentdesigned to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensurethat the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the studyand the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to triggerinfection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that timeranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designingscientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all thedose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.a review of banned mad cow feed in USA;BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMADate: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCTa) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.REASONDairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tonsDISTRIBUTION AL______________________________http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.htmlPRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tonsDISTRIBUTION AL and MS______________________________PRODUCTa) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bagsDISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TNEND OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006###http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.htmlSubject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCTa) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODEProduct manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tonsDISTRIBUTION AL and FLEND OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006###http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.htmlMAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II______________________________PRODUCTa) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODEa) Bulkb) Nonec) Bulkd) BulkRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.REASONPossible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tonsDISTRIBUTION NationwideEND OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006###http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PSTRECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II___________________________________PRODUCTBulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007CODECattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERPfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.Firm initiated recall is ongoing.REASONBlood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE42,090 lbs.DISTRIBUTIONWI___________________________________PRODUCTCustom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007CODEThe firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERRangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.REASONProducts manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE9,997,976 lbs.DISTRIBUTIONID and NVEND OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm*** PLEASE SEE THIS URGENT UPDATE ON CWD AND FEED ANIMAL PROTEIN ***Sunday, March 20, 2016Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed ***UPDATED MARCH 2016*** Singeltary SubmissionSEE MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS AFER MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS ;Tuesday, April 19, 2016Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0764 for Animal Feed Regulatory Program Standards Singeltary Comment SubmissionMONDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2022Docket No: 2002N-0273 (formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food and Feed Scientists Comments December 20, 2005This information is critical, and should continue to be collected.The TSE prion is spreading across the USA in Cervid as in CWD TSE Prion.The mad cow surveillance, feed ban, testing, and SRM removal there from, has been, and still is, a terrible failure.WE know that the USA Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) of August 1997 was/is a colossal failure, and proven to be so year after year, decade after decade, and this was just admitted by the FDA et al (see below FDA Reports on VFD Compliance Sept. 2019 report).God, all these decades you hear from all the warning letters on SRM that were released to the public for consumption, that even if they did eat a SRM, the BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) of August 1997 would save that tissue from that animal from having a TSE Prion, was nothing but lies. what about those children all across the USA that were fed the most high risk cattle for mad cow disease, i.e. dead stock downer cows via the USDA School lunch program, who will watch those kids for the next 50 years for cjd tse prion aka mad cow disease, let alone all the folks consuming SRMs that have been exposed to mad cow type disease in different livestock species, due to the fact the USA colossal failure of the BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) of August 1997. it's all documented below, see for yourself; SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019 FDA Reports on VFD ComplianceTuesday, September 10, 2019FSIS [Docket No. FSIS–2019–0021] Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials Singeltary Submission
Transmission of prion infectivity from CWD-infected macaque tissues to rodent models demonstrates the zoonotic potential of chronic wasting disease.
Samia Hannaouia, Ginny Chenga, Wiebke Wemheuerb, Walter J. Schulz-Schaefferb, Sabine Gilcha, and Hermann M. Schätzla
aDepartment of Comparative Biology and Experimental Medicine, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine & Hotchkiss Brain Institute; University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada; bInstitute of Neuropathology, Medical Faculty, Saarland University, Homburg/Saar, Germany
Aims: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a prion disease of cervids. Its rapid geographic expansion, shedding of infectivity and persistence in the environment for many years are of concern for humans. Here, we provide the first evidence by transmission experiments to different transgenic mouse models and bank voles that Cynomolgus macaques inoculated via different routes with CWD-positive cervid tissues harbor infectious prions that elicit clinical disease in rodents.
Material and Methods: We used tissue materials from macaques inoculated with CWD to inoculate transgenic mice overexpressing cervid PrPCfollowed by transmission into bank voles. We used RT-QuIC, immunoblot and PET blot analysis to assess brains, spinal cords, and tissues of the gastrointestinal tract (GIT) for the presence of prions.
Results: Our results show that of the macaque materials that induced clinical disease in transgenic mice,73% were from the CNS (46% spinal cord and 27% brain), and 27% were from the spleen, although attack rates were low around 20%. Clinical mice did not display PK-resistant PrPSc(PrPres) in immunoblot, but showed low-levels of prion seeding activity. Transmission into bank voles from clinical transgenic mice led to a 100% attack rate with typical PrPressignature in immunoblot, which was different from that of voles inoculated directly with CWD or scrapie prions. High-level prion seeding activity in brain and spinal cord and PrPresdeposition in the brain were present. Remarkably, we also found prion seeding activity in GIT tissues of inoculated voles. Second passage in bank voles led to a 100% attack rate in voles inoculated with brain, spinal cord and small intestine material from first round animals, with PrPresin immunoblot, prion seeding activity, and PrPresdeposition in the brain. Shortened survival times indicate adaptation in the new host. This also shows that prions detected in GIT tissues are infectious and transmissible. Transmission of brain material from sick voles back to cervidized mice revealed transmission in these mice with a 100% attack rate, and interestingly, with different biochemical signature and distribution in the brain.
Conclusions: Our findings demonstrate that macaques, considered the best model for the zoonotic potential of prions, were infected upon CWD challenge, including oral one. The disease manifested as atypical in macaques and transgenic mice, but with infectivity present at all times, as unveiled in the bank vole model with an unusual tissue tropism.
Funded by: The National Institutes of Health, USA, and the Alberta Prion Research Institute/Alberta Innovates Canada.
Grant number: 1R01NS121016-01; 201,600,023
Acknowledgement: We thank Umberto Agrimi, Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, Italy, and Michael Beekes, Robert-Koch Institute Berlin, Germany, for providing the bank vole model. We thank the University of Calgary animal facility staff and Dr. Stephanie Anderson for animal care.
Transmission of Cervid Prions to Humanized Mice Demonstrates the Zoonotic Potential of CWD
Samia Hannaouia, Irina Zemlyankinaa, Sheng Chun Changa, Maria Immaculata Arifina, Vincent Béringueb, Debbie McKenziec, Hermann M. Schatzla, and Sabine Gilcha
aDepartment of Comparative Biology and Experimental Medicine, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; Hotchkiss Brain Institute; University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada; bUniversité Paris-Saclay, INRAE, UVSQ, VIM, Jouy-en-Josas, France; cDepartment of Biological Sciences, Center for Prions and Protein Folding Diseases, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Aims: Chronic wasting disease (CWD), a prion disease of cervids, spreads efficiently among wild and farmed animals. Potential transmission to humans of CWD is a growing concern due to its increasing prevalence. Here, we aimed to determine the zoonotic potential of CWD using a mouse model for human prion diseases.
Material and Methods: Transgenic mice overexpressing human PrPChomozygous for methionine at codon 129 (tg650) were inoculated intracerebrally with brain homogenates of white-tailed deer infected with Wisc-1/CWD1 or 116AG CWD strains. Mice were monitored for clinical signs and were euthanized at terminal disease. Brains were tested by RT-QuIC, western blot upon PK digestion, and immunohistochemistry; fecal homogenates were analyzed by RT-QuIC. Brain/spinal cord and fecal homogenates of CWD-inoculated tg650 mice were inoculated into tg650 mice or bank voles. Brain homogenates of bank voles inoculated with fecal homogenates of CWD-infected tg650 mice were used for second passage in bank voles.
Results: Here, we provide the strongest evidence supporting the zoonotic potential of CWD prions, and their possible phenotype in humans. Inoculation of mice expressing human PrPCwith deer CWD isolates (strains Wisc-1 and 116AG) resulted in atypical clinical manifestations in > 75% of the mice, with myoclonus as leading clinical sign. Most of tg650 brain homogenates were positive for seeding activity in RT-QuIC. Clinical disease and presentation was transmissible to tg650 mice and bank voles. Intriguingly, protease-resistant PrP in the brain of tg650 mice resembled that found in a familial human prion disease and was transmissible upon passage. Abnormal PrP aggregates upon infection with Wisc-1 were detectable in thalamus, hypothalamus, and midbrain/pons regions.
Unprecedented in human prion disease, feces of CWD-inoculated tg650 mice harbored prion seeding activity and infectious prions, as shown by inoculation of bank voles and tg650 with fecal homogenates.
Conclusions: This is the first evidence that CWD can infect humans and cause disease with a distinctive clinical presentation, signature, and tropism, which might be transmissible between humans while current diagnostic assays might fail to detect it. These findings have major implications for public health and CWD-management.
Funded by: We are grateful for financial support from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the National Institutes of Health, Genome Canada, and the Alberta Prion Research Institute. SG is supported by the Canada Research Chairs program.
Acknowledgement: We thank Dr. Trent Bollinger, WCVM, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada, for providing brain tissue from the WTD-116AG isolate, Dr. Stéphane Haïk, ICM, Paris, France, for providing brain tissue from vCJD and sCJD cases, and Dr. Umberto Agrimi, Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy, for the bank vole model. We thank animal facility staff for animal care, Dr. Stephanie Anderson for veterinary oversight, and Yo-Ching Cheng for preparing recombinant PrP substrates. Thank you to Dr. Stephanie Booth and Jennifer Myskiw, Public Health Agency of Canada, Canada.
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