From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 11:30 AM
Cc: wcopok@cvm.tamu.edu ; CJD-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG ; cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com ; bloodcjd@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) 101 Drs. Walter Cook &
Donald S. Davis
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) 101 Drs. Walter Cook & Donald S.
Davis
Department of Veterinary Pathobiology, College of Veterinary Medicine,
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX (USA).
also, see cwd sampling from geo areas...and please remember, in Texas, captive deer industry can sample their own cervid, if they are certified as a cwd sampler...lot of luck there.
http://tpwd.texas.gov/publications/multimedia/media/presentations/2015-07-16_commission_meeting/2015-07-16_c_wolf.pdf
in reply to the above report Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) 101 Drs. Walter
Cook & Donald S. Davis.
I urge everyone to please read the rest of this
story...nightmare...debacle...blunder...take your pick.
let me try and enlighten you on what Drs. Walter Cook & Donald S. Davis
did NOT tell you.
a little updated science on the cwd tse prion disease will not hurt.
seems Texas is going to try and rewrite science again on TSE Prion aka mad
cow like disease, this time with cwd. Texas did with BSE aka mad cow disease,
and got caught, now cwd. a sad, sad, day for everyone.
Drs. Walter Cook & Donald S. Davis so wrongly claim ;
‘’Transmissibility of CWD to Humans • ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE that CWD is
transmissible to humans despite the frequent and long term (50+ years)
consumption of venison’’
this is absolutely wrong.
human cwd will NOT look like nvCJD. in fact, see ;
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic
potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human
PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests
that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP
codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in
the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar
pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK
OF CJD (p = 0.04). (SEE LINK IN REPORT HERE...TSS) PLUS, THE CDC DID NOT PUT
THIS WARNING OUT FOR THE WELL BEING OF THE DEER AND ELK ;
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease
Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey Journal of the American Dietetic
Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.
NOR IS THE FDA recalling this CWD positive elk meat for the well being of
the dead elk ;
Wednesday, March 18, 2009 Noah's Ark Holding, LLC, Dawson, MN RECALL Elk
products contain meat derived from an elk confirmed to have CWD NV, CA, TX, CO,
NY, UT, FL, OK RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: FOODS CLASS II
now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal
communications years ago. see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does
this mean there IS casual evidence ???? “Our conclusion stating that we found no
strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans” From: TSS
(216-119-163-189.ipset45.wt.net) Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???
Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST
From: "Belay, Ermias"
To: Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM
Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
Dear Sir/Madam,
In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached
to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD. That
assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me
if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we
do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating
venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD
transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is
limited to the patients we investigated.
Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
-----Original Message-----
From: Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM
To: rr26k@nih.gov; rrace@niaid.nih.gov; ebb8@CDC.GOV
Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM ......snip........end..............TSS
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008 1: Vet Res. 2008
Apr 3;39(4):41 A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease Sigurdson CJ.
snip...
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported
to the Surveillance Center***,
snip... full text ;
==============================
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic
potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human
PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests
that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP
codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in
the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
==============================
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.
PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FT. COLLINS CWD RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS
*** LATE-BREAKING ABSTRACTS PRION 2015 CONFERENCE ***
O18
Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions
Liuting Qing1, Ignazio Cali1,2, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang3, Diane Kofskey1,
Pierluigi Gambetti1, Wenquan Zou1, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve
University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 2Second University of Naples, Naples, Italy,
3Encore Health Resources, Houston, Texas, USA
***These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect
human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic
human carriers of CWD infection.***
P.105: RT-QuIC models trans-species prion transmission
Kristen Davenport, Davin Henderson, Candace Mathiason, and Edward Hoover
Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA
Additionally, human rPrP was competent for conversion by CWD and fCWD.
***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the
barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously
estimated.***
Wednesday, July 15, 2015
*** Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual
brain location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed? ***
not sure if you all are aware, but there has now been a captive deer confirmed with cwd in Texas, and they will have a difficult time tracing back all the deer from that facility. all cwd is mad cow disease in cervid. this is a nightmare for Texas, that the TPWD, the TDAH, and the captive deer industry have managed to put liptstick on and take her to the dance. see the map, but that’s just what Texas did with mad cow disease. they let one slip away, and then let the other mad cow sit on a shelf for 7 months with the BSE MRR policy was ratified. that was long ago, this cwd in captive is now ...Prion2015 conference out of Ft. Collins and other recent science shows what the real risk factors are long term. the captive game farming is a huge industry in Texas, and they will do what ever they can to protect it. recent science shows indeed that cwd is a risk factor to humans. check out the map of the trace out to other facilities in Texas. so if you decide later to do a story on this, here is the rest of that story. science you will not see from the captive industry or the TAHC et al.
Just got off the phone with TAHC, and I wanted to confirm this. but it
seems true, that in the state of Texas, even if you are a Captive game farmer,
breeder, part of the captive industry at all, if you want to sample your own
cervid for cwd, instead of the TAHC, TPWD, or Doctor, all you have to do is pass
the Certified CWD Sample Collector course, and bingo, you sample your own herd.
look, I am sending this to you to file it away, and so you will have this
information, in case I wind up underneath Galveston bay. I am not the most
popular guy in the world. there is a great deal of science, some confidential
here, and this is just the tip of the ice burg, and the industry hates sound
science. there is 17 or 18 years of it. but it’s here, all of it, and I assure
you, the hospitals are spreading it around.
think consumption of deer and beef, think of how much is consumed, think
subclinical TSE prion disease, think iatrogenic, or the pass it forward friendly
fire mode of transmission. hospitals, surgical, dental, blood, tissue. all
iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, until the route and source of the iatrogenic
event is discovered, documented, and put into the academic and public
domain.
I’m going to run a lot by you, but I think you should find interest in
this, and for later use, it just might come in handy.
the blogs of mine are for educational use, I do not advertise or make money
from this. this truth will set us free.
well, as some say, I will put my tin foil hat on, and go back to
work.
I have done this daily since December 14, 1997, and nothing much has change
since then. but I made a promise to mom, never forget, and never let them
forget...for your files///
The new Subchapter C, which is entitled “Chronic Wasting Disease” includes
standards and requirements for persons authorized by the commission to perform
work as a Certified CWD Sample Collector. The provisions also establish
application, training and recordkeeping requirements. A Certified CWD Sample
Collector is an individual who has completed commission provided or approved
training on the collection and preservation of samples for CWD testing and on
proper recordkeeping, and who has been authorized to perform these activities by
the commission.
For more information about the CWD herd program, call your TAHC region
office or 800-550-8242 x777.
IN my opinion, to let anyone other than a certified Doctor of Veterinarian
have anything to do with sampling cervid for Chronic Wasting Disease CWD, is
simply not acceptable. but does not surprise me. it is an accident waiting,
yearning to happen. ...tss
*** SEE TEXAS HERD TRACE OUT FACILITIES MAP ***
Tuesday, July 21, 2015
*** Texas CWD Medina County Herd Investigation Update July 16, 2015 ***
Wednesday, July 22, 2015
Texas Certified Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Sample Collector, like the Wolf
Guarding the Henhouse
***TO DATE, there have been 8 _documented_ case of CWD in Texas. the state
of Texas has floundered to long with CWD TSE prion. if Texas does not act now,
and caters to the industry, you will look at another Wisconsin in relations to
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD. CWD has been waltzing across Texas from New Mexico
for over a decade, long enough to spread this CWD all across the state. Texas
thought it was immune to mad cow disease, Texas fell to mad cow disease after a
long attempt to cover it up. that is a fact, and everyone around the world knows
it. how will Texas handle CWD, probably the same way, Texas will cater to the
industry, and thus, cwd tse prion will be trucked to hell and back. I urge every
state out there to stay very keen to how TAHC TPWD handle this cwd, or you may
be the next state with CWD TSE prion. because the only thing the state of Texas
has come to care about, is the state of Texas and their corporate interest$$$
...terry
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD WISCONSIN Almond Deer (Buckhorn Flats) Farm
Update DECEMBER 2011 The CWD infection rate was nearly 80%, the highest ever in
a North American captive herd. RECOMMENDATION: That the Board approve the
purchase of 80 acres of land for $465,000 for the Statewide Wildlife Habitat
Program in Portage County and approve the restrictions on public use of the
site.SUMMARY:
Wisconsin : 436 Deer Have Escaped From Farms to Wild
Date: March 18, 2003 Source: Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
Contacts: LEE BERGQUIST lbergquist@journalsentinel.com
State finds violations, lax record keeping at many sites, report says A
state inspection of private deer farms, prompted by the discovery of chronic
wasting disease, found that 436 white-tailed deer escaped into the wild,
officials said Tuesday
The Department of Natural Resources found that captive deer have escaped
from one-third of the state's 550 deer farms over the lifetime of the
operations. The agency also uncovered hundreds of violations and has sought a
total of 60 citations or charges against deer farm operators.
Hundreds of deer escape
The DNR found a total of 671 deer that escaped farms - 436 of which were
never found - because of storm-damaged fences, gates being left open or the
animals jumping over or through fences.
In one example in Kewaunee County, a deer farmer's fence was knocked down
in a summer storm. Ten deer escaped, and the farmer told the DNR he had no
intention of trying to reclaim them. The DNR found five of the deer, killed them
and cited the farmer for violation of a regulation related to fencing.
Another deer farmer near Mishicot, in Manitowoc County, released all nine
of his whitetails last summer after he believed the discovery of chronic wasting
disease was going to drive down the market for captive deer.
The DNR found 24 instances of unlicensed deer farms and issued 19
citations.
Game Farms Inspected
A summary of the findings of the Department of Natural Resources'
inspection of 550 private white-tailed deer farms in the state: The deer farms
contained at least 16,070 deer, but the DNR believes there are more deer in
captivity than that because large deer farms are unable to accurately count
their deer. 671 deer had escaped from game farms, including 436 that were never
found.
24 farmers were unlicensed. One had been operating illegally since 1999
after he was denied a license because his deer fence did not meet minimum
specifications.
Records maintained by operators ranged from "meticulous documentation to
relying on memory." At least 227 farms conducted various portions of their deer
farm business with cash. Over the last three years, 1,222 deer died on farms for
various reasons. Disease testing was not performed nor required on the majority
of deer. Farmers reported doing business with people in 22 other states and one
Canadian province. ..
Wednesday, March 04, 2015
Disease sampling results provide current snapshot of CWD in Wisconsin
finding 324 positive detections statewide in 2014
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
*** Wisconsin tracks 81 deer from game farm with CWD buck to seven other
states
For Immediate Release Thursday, October 2, 2014
Dustin Vande Hoef 515/281-3375 or 515/326-1616 (cell) or
Dustin.VandeHoef@IowaAgriculture.gov
TEST RESULTS FROM CAPTIVE DEER HERD WITH CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE RELEASED
79.8 percent of the deer tested positive for the disease
DES MOINES – The Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship today
announced that the test results from the depopulation of a quarantined captive
deer herd in north-central Iowa showed that 284 of the 356 deer, or 79.8% of the
herd, tested positive for Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD). The owners of the
quarantined herd have entered into a fence maintenance agreement with the Iowa
Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship,which requires the owners to
maintain the 8’ foot perimeter fence around the herd premises for five years
after the depopulation was complete and the premises had been cleaned and
disinfected CWD is a progressive, fatal, degenerative neurological disease of
farmed and free-ranging deer, elk, and moose. There is no known treatment or
vaccine for CWD. CWD is not a disease that affects humans.On July 18, 2012, USDA
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS)National Veterinary Services
Lab in Ames, IA confirmed that a male whitetail deer harvested from a hunting
preserve in southeast IA was positive for CWD. An investigation revealed that
this animal had just been introduced into the hunting preserve from the
above-referenced captive deer herd in north-central Iowa.The captive deer herd
was immediately quarantined to prevent the spread of CWD. The herd has remained
in quarantine until its depopulation on August 25 to 27, 2014.The Iowa
Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship participated in a joint operation
to depopulate the infected herd with USDA Veterinary Services, which was the
lead agency, and USDA Wildlife Services.Federal indemnity funding became
available in 2014. USDA APHIS appraised the captive deer herd of 376 animals at
that time, which was before depopulation and testing, at $1,354,250. At that
time a herd plan was developed with the owners and officials from USDA and the
Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship.Once the depopulation was
complete and the premises had been cleaned and disinfected, indemnity of
$917,100.00 from the USDA has been or will be paid to the owners as compensation
for the 356 captive deer depopulated.The Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land
Stewardship operates a voluntary CWD program for farms that sell live animals.
Currently 145 Iowa farms participate in the voluntary program. The
above-referenced captive deer facility left the voluntary CWD program prior to
the discovery of the disease as they had stopped selling live animals. All deer
harvested in a hunting preserve must be tested for CWD. -30-
*** see history of this CWD blunder here ;
On June 5, 2013, DNR conducted a fence inspection, after gaining approval
from surrounding landowners, and confirmed that the fenced had beencut or
removed in at least four separate locations; that the fence had degraded and was
failing to maintain the enclosure around the Quarantined Premises in at least
one area; that at least three gates had been opened;and that deer tracks were
visible in and around one of the open areas in the sand on both sides of the
fence, evidencing movement of deer into the Quarantined Premises.
as disgusting as this may be, the slaughter must happen, it’s the only way
to date, with cwd tse prion disease.
all cervid tested after slaughter, and test results must be released to the
public.
the tse prion aka mad cow type disease is not your normal pathogen.
I have seen it. my mother died from confirmed hvCJD dod 12/14/97. just made
a promise to mom. never forget, and never let them forget.
the science is there. but the politics will not allow the science to be
brought forth.
I have followed this debacle daily for 17 some odd years.
here is the rest of this nightmare if you want the facts...
kind regards, terry
The TSE prion disease survives ashing to 600 degrees celsius, that’s around
1112 degrees farenheit.
you cannot cook the TSE prion disease out of meat.
you can take the ash and mix it with saline and inject that ash into a
mouse, and the mouse will go down with TSE.
Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel
Production as well.
the TSE prion agent also survives Simulated Wastewater Treatment Processes.
IN fact, you should also know that the TSE Prion agent will survive in the
environment for years, if not decades.
you can bury it and it will not go away.
The TSE agent is capable of infected your water table i.e. Detection of
protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area.
it’s not your ordinary pathogen you can just cook it out and be done with.
that’s what’s so worrisome about Iatrogenic mode of transmission, a simple
autoclave will not kill this TSE prion agent.
New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent:
Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of
replication
The infectious agents responsible for transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy (TSE) are notoriously resistant to most physical and chemical
methods used for inactivating pathogens, including heat. It has long been
recognized, for example, that boiling is ineffective and that higher
temperatures are most efficient when combined with steam under pressure (i.e.,
autoclaving). As a means of decontamination, dry heat is used only at the
extremely high temperatures achieved during incineration, usually in excess of
600°C. It has been assumed, without proof, that incineration totally inactivates
the agents of TSE, whether of human or animal origin.
Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel
Production
Histochemical analysis of hamster brains inoculated with the solid residue
showed typical spongiform degeneration and vacuolation. Re-inoculation of these
brains into a new cohort of hamsters led to onset of clinical scrapie symptoms
within 75 days, suggesting that the specific infectivity of the prion protein
was not changed during the biodiesel process. The biodiesel reaction cannot be
considered a viable prion decontamination method for MBM, although we observed
increased survival time of hamsters and reduced infectivity greater than 6 log
orders in the solid MBM residue. Furthermore, results from our study compare for
the first time prion detection by Western Blot versus an infectivity bioassay
for analysis of biodiesel reaction products. We could show that biochemical
analysis alone is insufficient for detection of prion infectivity after a
biodiesel process.
Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a
CWD-endemic area
The data presented here demonstrate that sPMCA can detect low levels of
PrPCWD in the environment, corroborate previous biological and experimental data
suggesting long term persistence of prions in the environment2,3 and imply that
PrPCWD accumulation over time may contribute to transmission of CWD in areas
where it has been endemic for decades. This work demonstrates the utility of
sPMCA to evaluate other environmental water sources for PrPCWD, including
smaller bodies of water such as vernal pools and wallows, where large numbers of
cervids congregate and into which prions from infected animals may be shed and
concentrated to infectious levels.
A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1
Materials and Wastewater During Processing
Keywords:Abattoir;bovine spongiform encephalopathy;QRA;scrapie;TSE
In this article the development and parameterization of a quantitative
assessment is described that estimates the amount of TSE infectivity that is
present in a whole animal carcass (bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE] for
cattle and classical/atypical scrapie for sheep and lambs) and the amounts that
subsequently fall to the floor during processing at facilities that handle
specified risk material (SRM). BSE in cattle was found to contain the most oral
doses, with a mean of 9864 BO ID50s (310, 38840) in a whole carcass compared to
a mean of 1851 OO ID50s (600, 4070) and 614 OO ID50s (155, 1509) for a sheep
infected with classical and atypical scrapie, respectively. Lambs contained the
least infectivity with a mean of 251 OO ID50s (83, 548) for classical scrapie
and 1 OO ID50s (0.2, 2) for atypical scrapie. The highest amounts of infectivity
falling to the floor and entering the drains from slaughtering a whole carcass
at SRM facilities were found to be from cattle infected with BSE at rendering
and large incineration facilities with 7.4 BO ID50s (0.1, 29), intermediate
plants and small incinerators with a mean of 4.5 BO ID50s (0.1, 18), and
collection centers, 3.6 BO ID50s (0.1, 14). The lowest amounts entering drains
are from lambs infected with classical and atypical scrapie at intermediate
plants and atypical scrapie at collection centers with a mean of 3 × 10−7 OO
ID50s (2 × 10−8, 1 × 10−6) per carcass. The results of this model provide key
inputs for the model in the companion paper published here.
*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at
least 16 years***
Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3
Longitudinal Detection of Prion Shedding in Saliva and Urine by
CWD-Infected Deer by RT-QuIC
Davin M. Henderson1, Nathaniel D. Denkers1, Clare E. Hoover1, Nina
Garbino1, Candace K. Mathiason1 and Edward A. Hoover1# + Author
Affiliations
1Prion Research Center, Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and
Pathology, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado
State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 ABSTRACT Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD)
is an emergent, rapidly spreading prion disease of cervids. Shedding of
infectious prions in saliva and urine is thought to be an important factor in
CWD transmission. To help elucidate this issue, we applied an in vitro
amplification assay to determine the onset, duration, and magnitude of prion
shedding in longitudinally collected saliva and urine samples from CWD-exposed
white-tailed deer. We detected prion shedding as early as 3 months after CWD
exposure and sustained shedding throughout the disease course. We estimated that
a 50% lethal dose (LD50) for cervidized transgenic mice would be contained in 1
ml of infected deer saliva or 10 ml or urine. Given the average course of
infection and daily production of these body fluids, an infected deer would shed
thousands of prion infectious dosesover the course of CWD infection. The direct
and indirect environmental impact of this magnitude of prion shedding for cervid
and non-cervid species is surely significant.
Importance: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an emerging and uniformly
fatal prion disease affecting free ranging deer and elk and now recognized in 22
United States and 2 C anadian Provinces. It is unique among prion diseases in
that it is transmitted naturally though wild populations. A major hypothesis for
CWD's florid spread is that prions are shed in excreta and transmitted via
direct or indirect environmental contact. Here we use a rapid in vitro assay to
show that infectious doses of CWD prions are in fact shed throughout the
multi-year disease course in deer. This finding is an important advance in
assessing the risks posed by shed CWD prions to animals as well as humans.
FOOTNOTES
↵#To whom correspondence should be addressed: Edward A. Hoover, Prion
Research Center, Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, Colorado
State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, US Email: edward.hoover@colostate.edu
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip...
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation
(21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin)
from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With
regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may
not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered
at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the
animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a
requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD
eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to
slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive
animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from
the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES.
It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin
processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible
risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk
protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data
on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these
products.
snip...
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of
deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of
Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs
of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span
weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive
salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in
interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams,
2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected
with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be
introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer
populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with
CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via
affected venison.
snip...
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and
can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip...
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil
and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a
bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are
present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with
CWD prion.
snip...
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving
between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling
to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing,
footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible.
For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the
increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant
uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip...
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher
probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer
given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists
and returning GB residents.
snip...
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION, how much does it pay to find CWD
$$$
CWD, spreading it around...
for the game farm industry, and their constituents, to continue to believe
that they are _NOT_, and or insinuate that they have _NEVER_ been part of the
problem, will only continue to help spread cwd. the game farming industry, from
the shooting pens, to the urine mills, the antler mills, the sperm mills, velvet
mills, shooting pens, to large ranches, are not the only problem, but it is
painfully obvious that they have been part of the problem for decades and
decades, just spreading it around, as with transportation and or exportation and
or importation of cervids from game farming industry, and have been proven to
spread cwd. no one need to look any further than South Korea blunder ;
===========================================
spreading cwd around...
Between 1996 and 2002, chronic wasting disease was diagnosed in 39 herds of
farmed elk in Saskatchewan in a single epidemic. All of these herds were
depopulated as part of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s (CFIA) disease
eradication program. Animals, primarily over 12 mo of age, were tested for the
presence CWD prions following euthanasia. Twenty-one of the herds were linked
through movements of live animals with latent CWD from a single infected source
herd in Saskatchewan, 17 through movements of animals from 7 of the secondarily
infected herds.
***The source herd is believed to have become infected via importation of
animals from a game farm in South Dakota where CWD was subsequently diagnosed
(7,4). A wide range in herd prevalence of CWD at the time of herd depopulation
of these herds was observed. Within-herd transmission was observed on some
farms, while the disease remained confined to the introduced animals on other
farms.
spreading cwd around...
Friday, May 13, 2011
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) outbreaks and surveillance program in the
Republic of Korea
Hyun-Joo Sohn, Yoon-Hee Lee, Min-jeong Kim, Eun-Im Yun, Hyo-Jin Kim,
Won-Yong Lee, Dong-Seob Tark, In- Soo Cho, Foreign Animal Disease Research
Division, National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, Republic of Korea
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has been recognized as an important prion
disease in native North America deer and Rocky mountain elks. The disease is a
unique member of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), which
naturally affects only a few species. CWD had been limited to USA and Canada
until 2000.
On 28 December 2000, information from the Canadian government showed that a
total of 95 elk had been exported from farms with CWD to Korea. These consisted
of 23 elk in 1994 originating from the so-called “source farm” in Canada, and 72
elk in 1997, which had been held in pre export quarantine at the “source
farm”.Based on export information of CWD suspected elk from Canada to Korea, CWD
surveillance program was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
(MAF) in 2001.
All elks imported in 1997 were traced back, however elks imported in 1994
were impossible to identify. CWD control measures included stamping out of all
animals in the affected farm, and thorough cleaning and disinfection of the
premises. In addition, nationwide clinical surveillance of Korean native
cervids, and improved measures to ensure reporting of CWD suspect cases were
implemented.
Total of 9 elks were found to be affected. CWD was designated as a
notifiable disease under the Act for Prevention of Livestock Epidemics in 2002.
Additional CWD cases - 12 elks and 2 elks - were diagnosed in 2004 and
2005.
Since February of 2005, when slaughtered elks were found to be positive,
all slaughtered cervid for human consumption at abattoirs were designated as
target of the CWD surveillance program. Currently, CWD laboratory testing is
only conducted by National Reference Laboratory on CWD, which is the Foreign
Animal Disease Division (FADD) of National Veterinary Research and Quarantine
Service (NVRQS).
In July 2010, one out of 3 elks from Farm 1 which were slaughtered for the
human consumption was confirmed as positive. Consequently, all cervid – 54 elks,
41 Sika deer and 5 Albino deer – were culled and one elk was found to be
positive. Epidemiological investigations were conducted by Veterinary
Epidemiology Division (VED) of NVRQS in collaboration with provincial veterinary
services.
Epidemiologically related farms were found as 3 farms and all cervid at
these farms were culled and subjected to CWD diagnosis. Three elks and 5
crossbreeds (Red deer and Sika deer) were confirmed as positive at farm 2.
All cervids at Farm 3 and Farm 4 – 15 elks and 47 elks – were culled and
confirmed as negative.
Further epidemiological investigations showed that these CWD outbreaks were
linked to the importation of elks from Canada in 1994 based on circumstantial
evidences.
In December 2010, one elk was confirmed as positive at Farm 5.
Consequently, all cervid – 3 elks, 11 Manchurian Sika deer and 20 Sika deer –
were culled and one Manchurian Sika deer and seven Sika deer were found to be
positive. This is the first report of CWD in these sub-species of deer.
Epidemiological investigations found that the owner of the Farm 2 in CWD
outbreaks in July 2010 had co-owned the Farm 5.
In addition, it was newly revealed that one positive elk was introduced
from Farm 6 of Jinju-si Gyeongsang Namdo. All cervid – 19 elks, 15 crossbreed
(species unknown) and 64 Sika deer – of Farm 6 were culled, but all confirmed as
negative.
PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FT. COLLINS CWD RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS
*** LATE-BREAKING ABSTRACTS PRION 2015 CONFERENCE ***
O18
Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions
Liuting Qing1, Ignazio Cali1,2, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang3, Diane Kofskey1,
Pierluigi Gambetti1, Wenquan Zou1, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve
University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 2Second University of Naples, Naples, Italy,
3Encore Health Resources, Houston, Texas, USA
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a widespread and expanding prion disease
in free-ranging and captive cervid species in North America. The zoonotic
potential of CWD prions is a serious public health concern. Current literature
generated with in vitro methods and in vivo animal models (transgenic mice,
macaques and squirrel monkeys) reports conflicting results. The susceptibility
of human CNS and peripheral organs to CWD prions remains largely unresolved. In
our earlier bioassay experiments using several humanized transgenic mouse lines,
we detected protease-resistant PrPSc in the spleen of two out of 140 mice that
were intracerebrally inoculated with natural CWD isolates, but PrPSc was not
detected in the brain of the same mice. Secondary passages with such
PrPSc-positive CWD-inoculated humanized mouse spleen tissues led to efficient
prion transmission with clear clinical and pathological signs in both humanized
and cervidized transgenic mice. Furthermore, a recent bioassay with natural CWD
isolates in a new humanized transgenic mouse line led to clinical prion
infection in 2 out of 20 mice. These results indicate that the CWD prion has the
potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there
might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.
==================
***These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect
human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic
human carriers of CWD infection.***
==================
P.105: RT-QuIC models trans-species prion transmission
Kristen Davenport, Davin Henderson, Candace Mathiason, and Edward Hoover
Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA
The propensity for trans-species prion transmission is related to the
structural characteristics of the enciphering and heterologous PrP, but the
exact mechanism remains mostly mysterious. Studies of the effects of primary or
tertiary prion protein structures on trans-species prion transmission have
relied primarily upon animal bioassays, making the influence of prion protein
structure vs. host co-factors (e.g. cellular constituents, trafficking, and
innate immune interactions) difficult to dissect. As an alternative strategy, we
used real-time quakinginduced conversion (RT-QuIC) to investigate trans-species
prion conversion.
To assess trans-species conversion in the RT-QuIC system, we compared
chronic wasting disease (CWD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) prions,
as well as feline CWD (fCWD) and feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE). Each
prion was seeded into each host recombinant PrP (full-length rPrP of
white-tailed deer, bovine or feline). We demonstrated that fCWD is a more
efficient seed for feline rPrP than for white-tailed deer rPrP, which suggests
adaptation to the new host.
Conversely, FSE maintained sufficient BSE characteristics to more
efficiently convert bovine rPrP than feline rPrP. Additionally, human rPrP was
competent for conversion by CWD and fCWD. ***This insinuates that, at the level
of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to
humans is less robust than previously estimated.
================
***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the
barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously
estimated.***
================
Willingham, Erin McNulty, Kelly Anderson, Jeanette Hayes-Klug, Amy Nalls,
and Candace Mathiason Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy (TSE), of free-ranging and captive cervids (deer, elk and moose).
The presence of infectious prions in the tissues, bodily fluids and
environments of clinical and preclinical CWD-infected animals is thought to
account for its high transmission efficiency. Recently it has been recognized
that mother to offspring transmission may contribute to the facile transmission
of some TSEs. Although the mechanism behind maternal transmission is not yet
known, the extended asymptomatic TSE carrier phase (lasting years to decades)
suggests that it may have implications in the spread of prions.
Placental trafficking and/or secretion in milk are 2 means by which
maternal prion transmission may occur. In these studies we explore these avenues
during early and late infection using a transgenic mouse model expressing cervid
prion protein. Na€ıve and CWD-infected dams were bred at both timepoints, and
were allowed to bear and raise their offspring. Milk was collected from the dams
for prion analysis, and the offspring were observed for TSE disease progression.
Terminal tissues harvested from both dams and offspring were analyzed for
prions.
We have demonstrated that
(1) CWDinfected TgCerPRP females successfully breed and bear offspring, and
(2) the presence of PrPCWD in reproductive and mammary tissue from
CWD-infected dams.
We are currently analyzing terminal tissue harvested from offspring born to
CWD-infected dams for the detection of PrPCWD and amplification competent
prions. These studies will provide insight into the potential mechanisms and
biological significance associated with mother to offspring transmission of
TSEs.
==============
P.157: Uptake of prions into plants
Christopher Johnson1, Christina Carlson1, Matthew Keating1,2, Nicole
Gibbs1, Haeyoon Chang1, Jamie Wiepz1, and Joel Pedersen1 1USGS National Wildlife
Health Center; Madison, WI USA; 2University of Wisconsin - Madison; Madison, WI
USA
Soil may preserve chronic wasting disease (CWD) and scrapie infectivity in
the environment, making consumption or inhalation of soil particles a plausible
mechanism whereby na€ıve animals can be exposed to prions. Plants are known to
absorb a variety of substances from soil, including whole proteins, yet the
potential for plants to take up abnormal prion protein (PrPTSE) and preserve
prion infectivity is not known. In this study, we assessed PrPTSE uptake into
roots using laser scanning confocal microscopy with fluorescently tagged PrPTSE
and we used serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (sPMCA) and detect
and quantify PrPTSE levels in plant aerial tissues. Fluorescence was identified
in the root hairs of the model plant Arabidopsis thaliana, as well as the crop
plants alfalfa (Medicago sativa), barley (Hordeum vulgare) and tomato (Solanum
lycopersicum) upon exposure to tagged PrPTSE but not a tagged control
preparation. Using sPMCA, we found evidence of PrPTSE in aerial tissues of A.
thaliana, alfalfa and maize (Zea mays) grown in hydroponic cultures in which
only roots were exposed to PrPTSE. Levels of PrPTSE in plant aerial tissues
ranged from approximately 4 £ 10 ¡10 to 1 £ 10 ¡9 g PrPTSE g ¡1 plant dry weight
or 2 £ 105 to 7 £ 106 intracerebral ID50 units g ¡1 plant dry weight. Both stems
and leaves of A. thaliana grown in culture media containing prions are
infectious when intracerebrally-injected into mice. ***Our results suggest that
prions can be taken up by plants and that contaminated plants may represent a
previously unrecognized risk of human, domestic species and wildlife exposure to
prions.
===========
***Our results suggest that prions can be taken up by plants and that
contaminated plants may represent a previously unrecognized risk of human,
domestic species and wildlife exposure to prions.***
SEE ;
Friday, May 15, 2015
Grass Plants Bind, Retain, Uptake, and Transport Infectious Prions
Report
============
P.19: Characterization of chronic wasting disease isolates from freeranging
deer (Odocoileus sp) in Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada
Camilo Duque Velasquez1, Chiye Kim1, Nathalie Daude1, Jacques van der
Merwe1, Allen Herbst1, Trent Bollinger2, Judd Aiken1, and Debbie McKenzie1
1Centre for Prions and Protein Folding Diseases; University of Alberta;
Edmonton, Canada; 2Western College of Veterinary Medicine; University of
Saskatchewan; Saskatoon, Canada
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an emerging prion disease of free ranging
and captive species of Cervidae. In North America, CWD is enzootic in some wild
cervid populations and can circulate among different deer species. The
contagious nature of CWD prions and the variation of cervid PRNP alleles, which
influence host susceptibility, can result in the emergence and adaptation of
different CWD strains. These strains may impact transmission host range, disease
diagnosis, spread dynamics and efficacy of potential vaccines. We are
characterizing different CWD agents by biochemical analysis of the PrPCWD
conformers, propagation in vitro cell assays1 and by comparing transmission
properties and neuropathology in Tg33 (Q95G96) and Tg60 (Q95S96) mice.2 Although
Tg60 mice expressing S96- PrPC have been shown resistant to CWD infectivity from
various cervid species,2,3
***these transgenic mice are susceptible to H95 C CWD, a CWD strain derived
from experimental infection of deer expressing H95G96-PrPC. The diversity of
strains present in free-ranging mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus) and white-tailed
deer (Odocoileus virginianus) from Alberta and Saskatchewan is being determined
and will allow us to delineate the properties of CWD agents circulating in CWD
enzootic cervid populations of Canada.
References
1. van der Merwe J, Aiken J, Westaway D, McKenzie D. The standard scrapie
cell assay: Development, utility and prospects. Viruses 2015; 7(1):180–198;
PMID:25602372; http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/v7010180
2. Meade-White K, Race B, Trifilo M, Bossers A, Favara C, Lacasse R, Miller
M, Williams E, Oldstone M, Race R, Chesebro B. Resistance to chronic wasting
disease in transgenic mice expressing a naturally occurring allelic variant of
deer prion protein. J Virol 2007; 81(9):4533–4539; PMID: 17314157; http://dx. doi.org/10.1128/JVI.02762-06
3. Race B, Meade-White K, Miller MW, Fox KA, Chesebro B. In vivo comparison
of chronic wasting disease infectivity from deer with variation at prion protein
residue 96. J Virol 2011; 85(17):9235–9238; PMID: 21697479; http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/JVI.00790-11
=========
***these transgenic mice are susceptible to H95 C CWD, a CWD strain derived
from experimental infection of deer expressing H95G96-PrPC.
==========
P.136: Mother to offspring transmission of CWD—Detection in fawn tissues
using the QuIC assay
Amy Nalls, Erin McNulty, Clare Hoover, Jeanette Hayes-Klug, Kelly Anderson,
Edward Hoover, and Candace Mathiason Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO
USA
To investigate the role mother to offspring transmission plays in chronic
wasting disease (CWD), we have employed a small, polyestrous breeding, indoor
maintainable cervid model, the Reeves’ muntjac deer. Muntjac doe were inoculated
with CWD and tested positive by lymphoid biopsy at 4 months post inoculation.
From these CWD-infected doe, we obtained 3 viable fawns. These fawns tested
IHC-positive for CWD by lymphoid biopsy as early as 40 d post birth, and all
have been euthanized due to clinical disease at 31, 34 and 59 months post birth.
The QuIC assay demonstrates sensitivity and specificity in the detection of
conversion competent prions in peripheral IHC-positive tissues including tonsil,
mandibular, partotid, retropharyngeal, and prescapular lymph nodes, adrenal
gland, spleen and liver. In summary, using the muntjac deer model, we have
demonstrated CWD clinical disease in offspring born to CWD-infected doe and
found that the QuIC assay is an effective tool in the detection of prions in
peripheral tissues. ***Our findings demonstrate that transmission of prions from
mother to offspring can occur, and may be underestimated for all prion
diseases.
===============
***Our findings demonstrate that transmission of prions from mother to
offspring can occur, and may be underestimated for all prion diseases.
===============
I strenuously once again urge the FDA and its industry constituents, to
make it MANDATORY that all ruminant feed be banned to all ruminants, and this
should include all cervids as soon as possible for the following
reasons...
======
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administrations BSE Feed Regulation (21
CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from
deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to
feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used
for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high
risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed
system.
***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
======
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
Singeltary et al
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM THIRD ANNUAL
REPORT AUGUST 1994
Consumption of venison and veal was much less widespread among both cases
and controls. For both of these meats there was evidence of a trend with
increasing frequency of consumption being associated with increasing risk of
CJD. (not nvCJD, but sporadic CJD...tss) These associations were largely
unchanged when attention was restricted to pairs with data obtained from
relatives. ...
Table 9 presents the results of an analysis of these data.
There is STRONG evidence of an association between ‘’regular’’ veal eating
and risk of CJD (p = .0.01).
Individuals reported to eat veal on average at least once a year appear to
be at 13 TIMES THE RISK of individuals who have never eaten veal.
There is, however, a very wide confidence interval around this estimate.
There is no strong evidence that eating veal less than once per year is
associated with increased risk of CJD (p = 0.51).
The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar
pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK
OF CJD (p = 0.04).
There is some evidence that risk of CJD INCREASES WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY
OF LAMB EATING (p = 0.02).
The evidence for such an association between beef eating and CJD is weaker
(p = 0.14). When only controls for whom a relative was interviewed are included,
this evidence becomes a little STRONGER (p = 0.08).
snip...
It was found that when veal was included in the model with another
exposure, the association between veal and CJD remained statistically
significant (p = < 0.05 for all exposures), while the other exposures ceased
to be statistically significant (p = > 0.05).
snip...
In conclusion, an analysis of dietary histories revealed statistical
associations between various meats/animal products and INCREASED RISK OF CJD.
When some account was taken of possible confounding, the association between
VEAL EATING AND RISK OF CJD EMERGED AS THE STRONGEST OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS
STATISTICALLY. ...
snip...
In the study in the USA, a range of foodstuffs were associated with an
increased risk of CJD, including liver consumption which was associated with an
apparent SIX-FOLD INCREASE IN THE RISK OF CJD. By comparing the data from 3
studies in relation to this particular dietary factor, the risk of liver
consumption became non-significant with an odds ratio of 1.2 (PERSONAL
COMMUNICATION, PROFESSOR A. HOFMAN. ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM). (???...TSS)
snip...see full report ;
Friday, May 22, 2015
*** Chronic Wasting Disease and Program Updates - 2014 NEUSAHA Annual
Meeting 12-14 May 2014 ***
Saturday, May 30, 2015
PRION 2015 ORAL AND POSTER CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS
98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015
EDITORIAL
Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen
Cristina Acín
Resistant prions in the environment have been the sword of Damocles for
scrapie control and eradication. Attempts to establish which physical and
chemical agents could be applied to inactivate or moderate scrapie infectivity
were initiated in the 1960s and 1970s,with the first study of this type focusing
on the effect of heat treatment in reducing prion infectivity (Hunter and
Millson 1964). Nowadays, most of the chemical procedures that aim to inactivate
the prion protein are based on the method developed by Kimberlin and
collaborators (1983). This procedure consists of treatment with 20,000 parts per
million free chlorine solution, for a minimum of one hour, of all surfaces that
need to be sterilised (in laboratories, lambing pens, slaughterhouses, and so
on). Despite this, veterinarians and farmers may still ask a range of questions,
such as ‘Is there an official procedure published somewhere?’ and ‘Is there an
international organisation which recommends and defines the exact method of
scrapie decontamination that must be applied?’
From a European perspective, it is difficult to find a treatment that could
be applied, especially in relation to the disinfection of surfaces in lambing
pens of affected flocks. A 999/2001 EU regulation on controlling spongiform
encephalopathies (European Parliament and Council 2001) did not specify a
particular decontamination measure to be used when an outbreak of scrapie is
diagnosed. There is only a brief recommendation in Annex VII concerning the
control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE
s).
Chapter B of the regulation explains the measures that must be applied if
new caprine animals are to be introduced to a holding where a scrapie outbreak
has previously been diagnosed. In that case, the statement indicates that
caprine animals can be introduced ‘provided that a cleaning and disinfection of
all animal housing on the premises has been carried out following
destocking’.
Issues around cleaning and disinfection are common in prion prevention
recommendations, but relevant authorities, veterinarians and farmers may have
difficulties in finding the specific protocol which applies. The European Food
and Safety Authority (EFSA ) published a detailed report about the efficacy of
certain biocides, such as sodium hydroxide, sodium hypochlorite, guanidine and
even a formulation of copper or iron metal ions in combination with hydrogen
peroxide, against prions (EFSA 2009). The report was based on scientific
evidence (Fichet and others 2004, Lemmer and others 2004, Gao and others 2006,
Solassol and others 2006) but unfortunately the decontamination measures were
not assessed under outbreak conditions.
The EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards recently published its conclusions on
the scrapie situation in the EU after 10 years of monitoring and control of the
disease in sheep and goats (EFSA 2014), and one of the most interesting findings
was the Icelandic experience regarding the effect of disinfection in scrapie
control. The Icelandic plan consisted of: culling scrapie-affected sheep or the
whole flock in newly diagnosed outbreaks; deep cleaning and disinfection of
stables, sheds, barns and equipment with high pressure washing followed by
cleaning with 500 parts per million of hypochlorite; drying and treatment with
300 ppm of iodophor; and restocking was not permitted for at least two years.
Even when all of these measures were implemented, scrapie recurred on several
farms, indicating that the infectious agent survived for years in the
environment, even as many as 16 years after restocking (Georgsson and others
2006).
In the rest of the countries considered in the EFSA (2014) report,
recommendations for disinfection measures were not specifically defined at the
government level. In the report, the only recommendation that is made for sheep
is repopulation with sheep with scrapie-resistant genotypes. This reduces the
risk of scrapie recurrence but it is difficult to know its effect on the
infection.
Until the EFSA was established (in May 2003), scientific opinions about TSE
s were provided by the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of the EC, whose
advice regarding inactivation procedures focused on treating animal waste at
high temperatures (150°C for three hours) and high pressure alkaline hydrolysis
(SSC 2003). At the same time, the TSE Risk Management Subgroup of the Advisory
Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) in the UK published guidance on safe
working and the prevention of TSE infection. Annex C of the ACDP report
established that sodium hypochlorite was considered to be effective, but only if
20,000 ppm of available chlorine was present for at least one hour, which has
practical limitations such as the release of chlorine gas, corrosion,
incompatibility with formaldehyde, alcohols and acids, rapid inactivation of its
active chemicals and the stability of dilutions (ACDP 2009).
In an international context, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)
does not recommend a specific disinfection protocol for prion agents in its
Terrestrial Code or Manual. Chapter 4.13 of the Terrestrial Code, General
recommendations on disinfection and disinsection (OIE 2014), focuses on
foot-and-mouth disease virus, mycobacteria and Bacillus anthracis, but not on
prion disinfection. Nevertheless, the last update published by the OIE on bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (OIE 2012) indicates that few effective
decontamination techniques are available to inactivate the agent on surfaces,
and recommends the removal of all organic material and the use of sodium
hydroxide, or a sodium hypochlorite solution containing 2 per cent available
chlorine, for more than one hour at 20ºC.
The World Health Organization outlines guidelines for the control of TSE s,
and also emphasises the importance of mechanically cleaning surfaces before
disinfection with sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite for one hour (WHO
1999).
Finally, the relevant agencies in both Canada and the USA suggest that the
best treatments for surfaces potentially contaminated with prions are sodium
hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite at 20,000 ppm. This is a 2 per cent solution,
while most commercial household bleaches contain 5.25 per cent sodium
hypochlorite. It is therefore recommended to dilute one part 5.25 per cent
bleach with 1.5 parts water (CDC 2009, Canadian Food Inspection Agency
2013).
So what should we do about disinfection against prions? First, it is
suggested that a single protocol be created by international authorities to
homogenise inactivation procedures and enable their application in all
scrapie-affected countries. Sodium hypochlorite with 20,000 ppm of available
chlorine seems to be the procedure used in most countries, as noted in a paper
summarised on p 99 of this issue of Veterinary Record (Hawkins and others 2015).
But are we totally sure of its effectiveness as a preventive measure in a
scrapie outbreak? Would an in-depth study of the recurrence of scrapie disease
be needed?
What we can conclude is that, if we want to fight prion diseases, and
specifically classical scrapie, we must focus on the accuracy of diagnosis,
monitoring and surveillance; appropriate animal identification and control of
movements; and, in the end, have homogeneous and suitable protocols to
decontaminate and disinfect lambing barns, sheds and equipment available to
veterinarians and farmers. Finally, further investigations into the resistance
of prion proteins in the diversity of environmental surfaces are required.
References
snip...
98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015
Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following
cleaning and decontamination
Steve A. C. Hawkins, MIBiol, Pathology Department1, Hugh A. Simmons, BVSc
MRCVS, MBA, MA Animal Services Unit1, Kevin C. Gough, BSc, PhD2 and Ben C.
Maddison, BSc, PhD3 + Author Affiliations
1Animal and Plant Health Agency, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey
KT15 3NB, UK 2School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of
Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK 3ADAS
UK, School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham,
Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK E-mail for
correspondence: ben.maddison@adas.co.uk Abstract Scrapie of sheep/goats and
chronic wasting disease of deer/elk are contagious prion diseases where
environmental reservoirs are directly implicated in the transmission of disease.
In this study, the effectiveness of recommended scrapie farm decontamination
regimens was evaluated by a sheep bioassay using buildings naturally
contaminated with scrapie. Pens within a farm building were treated with either
20,000 parts per million free chorine solution for one hour or were treated with
the same but were followed by painting and full re-galvanisation or replacement
of metalwork within the pen. Scrapie susceptible lambs of the PRNP genotype
VRQ/VRQ were reared within these pens and their scrapie status was monitored by
recto-anal mucosa-associated lymphoid tissue. All animals became infected over
an 18-month period, even in the pen that had been subject to the most stringent
decontamination process. These data suggest that recommended current guidelines
for the decontamination of farm buildings following outbreaks of scrapie do
little to reduce the titre of infectious scrapie material and that environmental
recontamination could also be an issue associated with these premises.
SNIP...
Discussion
Thorough pressure washing of a pen had no effect on the amount of
bioavailable scrapie infectivity (pen B). The routine removal of prions from
surfaces within a laboratory setting is treatment for a minimum of one hour with
20,000 ppm free chlorine, a method originally based on the use of brain
macerates from infected rodents to evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination
(Kimberlin and others 1983). Further studies have also investigated the
effectiveness of hypochlorite disinfection of metal surfaces to simulate the
decontamination of surgical devices within a hospital setting. Such treatments
with hypochlorite solution were able to reduce infectivity by 5.5 logs to lower
than the sensitivity of the bioassay used (Lemmer and others 2004). Analogous
treatment of the pen surfaces did not effectively remove the levels of scrapie
infectivity over that of the control pens, indicating that this method of
decontamination is not effective within a farm setting. This may be due to the
high level of biological matrix that is present upon surfaces within the farm
environment, which may reduce the amount of free chlorine available to
inactivate any infectious prion. Remarkably 1/5 sheep introduced into pen D had
also became scrapie positive within nine months, with all animals in this pen
being RAMALT positive by 18 months of age. Pen D was no further away from the
control pen (pen A) than any of the other pens within this barn. Localised hot
spots of infectivity may be present within scrapie-contaminated environments,
but it is unlikely that pen D area had an amount of scrapie contamination that
was significantly different than the other areas within this building.
Similarly, there were no differences in how the biosecurity of pen D was
maintained, or how this pen was ventilated compared with the other pens. This
observation, perhaps, indicates the slower kinetics of disease uptake within
this pen and is consistent with a more thorough prion removal and
recontamination. These observations may also account for the presence of
inadvertent scrapie cases within other studies, where despite stringent
biosecurity, control animals have become scrapie positive during challenge
studies using barns that also housed scrapie-affected animals (Ryder and others
2009). The bioassay data indicate that the exposure of the sheep to a farm
environment after decontamination efforts thought to be effective in removing
scrapie is sufficient for the animals to become infected with scrapie. The main
exposure routes within this scenario are likely to be via the oral route, during
feeding and drinking, and respiratory and conjunctival routes. It has been
demonstrated that scrapie infectivity can be efficiently transmitted via the
nasal route in sheep (Hamir and others 2008), as is the case for CWD in both
murine models and in white-tailed deer (Denkers and others 2010, 2013).
Recently, it has also been demonstrated that CWD prions presented as dust when
bound to the soil mineral montmorillonite can be infectious via the nasal route
(Nichols and others 2013). When considering pens C and D, the actual source of
the infectious agent in the pens is not known, it is possible that biologically
relevant levels of prion survive on surfaces during the decontamination regimen
(pen C). With the use of galvanising and painting (pen D) covering and sealing
the surface of the pen, it is possible that scrapie material recontaminated the
pens by the movement of infectious prions contained within dusts originating
from other parts of the barn that were not decontaminated or from other areas of
the farm.
Given that scrapie prions are widespread on the surfaces of affected farms
(Maddison and others 2010a), irrespective of the source of the infectious prions
in the pens, this study clearly highlights the difficulties that are faced with
the effective removal of environmentally associated scrapie infectivity. This is
likely to be paralleled in CWD which shows strong similarities to scrapie in
terms of both the dissemination of prions into the environment and the facile
mode of disease transmission. These data further contribute to the understanding
that prion diseases can be highly transmissible between susceptible individuals
not just by direct contact but through highly stable environmental reservoirs
that are refractory to decontamination.
The presence of these environmentally associated prions in farm buildings
make the control of these diseases a considerable challenge, especially in
animal species such as goats where there is lack of genetic resistance to
scrapie and, therefore, no scope to re-stock farms with animals that are
resistant to scrapie.
Scrapie Sheep Goats Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE)
Accepted October 12, 2014. Published Online First 31 October 2014
Monday, November 3, 2014
Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following
cleaning and decontamination
PPo3-22:
Detection of Environmentally Associated PrPSc on a Farm with Endemic
Scrapie
Ben C. Maddison,1 Claire A. Baker,1 Helen C. Rees,1 Linda A. Terry,2 Leigh
Thorne,2 Susan J. Belworthy2 and Kevin C. Gough3 1ADAS-UK LTD; Department of
Biology; University of Leicester; Leicester, UK; 2Veterinary Laboratories
Agency; Surry, KT UK; 3Department of Veterinary Medicine and Science; University
of Nottingham; Sutton Bonington, Loughborough UK
Key words: scrapie, evironmental persistence, sPMCA
Ovine scrapie shows considerable horizontal transmission, yet the routes of
transmission and specifically the role of fomites in transmission remain poorly
defined. Here we present biochemical data demonstrating that on a
scrapie-affected sheep farm, scrapie prion contamination is widespread. It was
anticipated at the outset that if prions contaminate the environment that they
would be there at extremely low levels, as such the most sensitive method
available for the detection of PrPSc, serial Protein Misfolding Cyclic
Amplification (sPMCA), was used in this study. We investigated the distribution
of environmental scrapie prions by applying ovine sPMCA to samples taken from a
range of surfaces that were accessible to animals and could be collected by use
of a wetted foam swab. Prion was amplified by sPMCA from a number of these
environmental swab samples including those taken from metal, plastic and wooden
surfaces, both in the indoor and outdoor environment. At the time of sampling
there had been no sheep contact with these areas for at least 20 days prior to
sampling indicating that prions persist for at least this duration in the
environment. These data implicate inanimate objects as environmental reservoirs
of prion infectivity which are likely to contribute to disease transmission.
Wednesday, July 01, 2015
*** TEXAS Chronic Wasting Disease Detected in Medina County Captive Deer
Thursday, July 09, 2015
TEXAS Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Herd Plan for Trace-Forward Exposed
Herd with Testing of Exposed Animals
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission Special Meeting Thursday on Chronic
Wasting Disease CWD
Rare report of deer disease in Texas causes stir
Houston Chronicle
Rare report of deer disease in Texas causes stir, especially since it’s the
8 case of CWD documented in Texas, and the first case of CWD in Captive deer.
here is how I would have titled this article, and why.
Shannon Tompkins Finally Breaks Silence on Texas First Captive CWD Case and
Starts Off Spreading False Information About Risk Factors. ...
Thursday, July 16, 2015
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Confirmed Texas Trans Pecos March 18,
2015
Wednesday, March 25, 2015
*** Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Cases Confirmed In New Mexico 2013 and 2014
UPDATE 2015
Thursday, May 02, 2013
*** Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Texas Important Update on OBEX ONLY
TEXTING
Monday, February 11, 2013
TEXAS CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD Four New Positives Found in Trans Pecos
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
Chronic Wasting Disease Detected in Far West Texas
Monday, March 26, 2012
Texas Prepares for Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Possibility in Far West
Texas
***for anyone interested, here is some history of CWD along the Texas, New
Mexico border, and my attempt to keep up with it...terry
snip...
see history CWD Texas, New Mexico Border ;
Monday, March 26, 2012
3 CASES OF CWD FOUND NEW MEXICO MULE DEER SEVERAL MILES FROM TEXAS BORDER
Sunday, October 04, 2009
CWD NEW MEXICO SPREADING SOUTH TO TEXAS 2009 2009 Summary of Chronic
Wasting Disease in New Mexico New Mexico Department of Game and Fish
2001 - 2002
TEXAS OLD STATISTICS BELOW FOR PAST CWD TESTING;
Subject: CWD testing in Texas
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2002 19:45:14 –0500
From: Kenneth Waldrup
To: flounder@wt.net
CC: mcoats@tahc.state.tx.us
Dear Dr. Singletary,
In Fiscal Year 2001, seven deer from Texas were tested by the National
Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) for CWD (5 fallow deer and 2 white-tailed
deer). In Fiscal Year 2002, seven elk from Texas were tested at NVSL (no deer).
During these two years, an additional six elk and one white-tailed deer were
tested at the Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory (TVMDL). In Fiscal
Year 2002, four white-tailed deer (free-ranging clinical suspects) and at least
eight other white-tailed deer have been tested at TVMDL. One elk has been tested
at NVSL. All of these animals have been found negative for CWD. Dr. Jerry Cooke
of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department also has records of 601 clinically
ill white-tailed deer which were necropsied at Texas A&M during the late
1960's and early 1970's, and no spongiform encepalopathies were noted.
Thank you for your consideration.
Ken Waldrup, DVM, PhD Texas Animal Health Commission
========================
TEXAS CWD STATUS
Captive Cervids
There have been no reported CWD infections of captive elk or deer in Texas.
There is currently no mandatory surveillance program for susceptible cervids
kept on game farms, although, there has been voluntary surveillance since 1999,
which requires owners of participating herds to maintain an annual herd
inventory and submit samples for all mortalities of animals over 16 months of
age.
snip...
SO, i thought i would just see where these Ecoregions were, and just how
the CWD testing was distributed. YOU would think that with the cluster of CWD
bordering TEXAS at the WPMR in NM, you would have thought this would be where
the major CWD testing samples were to have been taken? wrong! let's have a look
at the sample testing. here is map of CWD in NM WPMR bordering TEXAS;
NEW MEXICO 7 POSITIVE CWD WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE MAP
NEXT, let's have a look at the overall distribution of CWD in Free-Ranging
Cervids and see where the CWD cluster in NM WSMR borders TEXAS;
Current Distribution of Chronic Wasting Disease in Free-Ranging Cervids
NOW, the MAP of the Exoregion where the samples were taken to test for CWD;
CWD SURVEILLANCE SAMPLE SUBMISSIONS TEXAS
Ecoregions of TEXAS
IF you look at the area around the NM WSMR where the CWD cluster was and
where it borders TEXAS, that ecoregion is called Trans Pecos region. Seems if my
Geography and my Ciphering is correct ;-) that region only tested 55% of it's
goal. THE most important area on the MAP and they only test some 96 samples,
this in an area that has found some 7 positive animals? NOW if we look at the
only other border where these deer from NM could cross the border into TEXAS,
this area is called the High Plains ecoregion, and again, we find that the
sampling for CWD was pathetic. HERE we find that only 9% of it's goal of CWD
sampling was met, only 16 samples were tested from some 175 that were suppose to
be sampled.
AS i said before;
> SADLY, they have not tested enough from the total population to
> know if CWD is in Texas or not.
BUT now, I will go one step further and state categorically that they are
not trying to find it. just the opposite it seems, they are waiting for CWD to
find them, as with BSE/TSE in cattle, and it will eventually...
snip...end
In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of
animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to
accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the
''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical
incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...
when the USA lost the BSE free gold card December 2003, then they found
that mad cow in 2004 in Texas, and covered it up until and act of Congress in
2005 finally had it retested and confirmed in Weybridge, but all the while they
were ratifying the BSE MRR policy, in lace of the BSE GBR risk assessments, all
bets were off, the legal trading of all strains of TSE prion disease became a
trading commodity, perfectly legal to trade, like it or not.
let me chime in here just a bit about this. that trade and wanting to know
where your food comes from works both ways.
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding
Infected Cattle
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the
farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or
dead dairy cattle...
In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of
animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to
accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the
''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical
incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...
IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure
Singeltary et al
Posted by flounder on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
Australia
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Official Committee Hansard SENATE RURAL AND
REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT REFERENCES COMMITTEE Reference: Import
restrictions on beef FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 CANBERRA BY AUTHORITY OF THE
SENATE
RRA&T 2 Senate Friday, 5 February 2010 RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND
TRANSPORT
[9.03 am]
BELLINGER, Mr Brad, Chairman, Australian Beef Association
CARTER, Mr John Edward, Director, Australian Beef Association
CHAIR—Welcome. Would you like to make an opening statement?
Mr Bellinger—Thank you. The ABA stands by its submission, which we made on
14
December last year, that the decision made by the government to allow the
importation of beef from BSE affected countries is politically based, not
science based. During this hearing we will bring forward compelling new evidence
to back up this statement. When I returned to my property after the December
hearing I received a note from an American citizen. I will read a small excerpt
from the mail he sent me in order to reinforce the dangers of allowing the
importation of beef from BSE affected countries. I have done a number of press
releases on this topic, and this fellow has obviously picked my details up from
the internet. His name is Terry Singeltary and he is from Bacliff, Texas. He
states, and rightfully so:
snip...end
snip...see full text 110 pages ;
for those interested, please see much more here ;
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
We have shown that cattle-adapted TME is the third cattle prion strain
(joining classical and L-type BSE) to be transmissible both to non-human
primates and transgenic mice overexpressing human PrP. However, the successful
transmission of raccoon TME to primate, inducing a disease with similar features
as cattle TME, extends this notion to TME-related strains independent of host
origin. Pathological, biochemical and bioassay investigations converged to
demonstrate the similarity between cattle-adapted TME and L-BSE.
PRION 2015 ORAL AND POSTER CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS
THANK YOU PRION 2015 TAYLOR & FRANCIS, Professor Chernoff, and
Professor Aguzzi et al, for making these PRION 2015 Congressional Poster and
Oral Abstracts available freely to the public. ...Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation
periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni,
Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys
Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies
reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The
transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that
an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the
absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a
transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are
reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD
summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first
evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic
potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for
BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their
phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to
assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid
origins even after very long silent incubation periods. We recently observed the
direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a
10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to some reported for
human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than
BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the third
potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), ***thus questioning the
origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our
different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended
incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...TSS
===============
Saturday, May 30, 2015
PRION 2015 ORAL AND POSTER CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to
FSIS.
Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns
Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S.
Singeltary.
This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on
the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points
in mind:
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Page 1 of 98
FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY
Wednesday, March 11, 2015
OIE and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reinforce Collaboration
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING COOL H.R. 2393 Agriculture Chairman K. Michael
Conaway (R-TX) Fears of US imports infected with mad cow disease is emerging as
an issue in trans-Pacific trade talks
Wednesday, July 15, 2015
Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual brain
location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed?
re those Texas mad cow cover up’s, you thought I might be kidding ???
2004, highly suspect stumbling and staggering mad cow reported, however, NO
TESTING DONE, ON ORDERS FROM AUSTIN $
May 4, 2004
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow
with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor
for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison)...
USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system
(CNS)
According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NHIS)
Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2
The memorandum notes that "it is essential that brain specimens be collected
from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance
of BSE."
The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week
staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a
request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an
APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant
to send the carcass for rendering.5
May 13,2004
Page 2
snip...
The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week
staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a
request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an
APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant
to send the carcass for rendering.5
This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of whether
this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between the number
of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows actually
tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease
Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us
Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at
OIG, ...............
snip...
There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully
request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America
over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...
Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff,
Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx
Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST In
Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford,
Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on
June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:
Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days
later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary
for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow
found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected.
just pondering... TSS
MAD COW IN TEXAS NOVEMBER 2004. ...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to
unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething,
but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you
confirm???
terry
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 –0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA
web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas. Carla At 09:44
AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting
unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you
comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary
Sr.>>
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: ...sniptss
our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's
announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by
NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when
we hear something. At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,
you wrote:
>why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?
>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:
>November 22: Press Release title here
>>star image More BSE information
>>>>terry
>>Carla Everett wrote:
>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...
>>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>
==========================
-------- Original Message --------
Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to
unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething,
but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you
confirm???
terry
==============================
USDA did not test possible mad cows
By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM
WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims
ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year,
but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency
tested only half that number.
""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were
preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of
test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in
the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the
ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
TEXAS 2ND MAD COW THAT WAS COVERED UP, AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, AND CALLS
FROM TSE PRION SCIENTIST AROUND THE GLOBE, THIS 2ND MAD COW IN TEXAS WAS
CONFIRMED
THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP
JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED
OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7
MONTHS LATER
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE
BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i
confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i
contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal
was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of
67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated.
All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were
determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined
that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to
be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are
presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In
addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the
index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to
trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter
channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and
one calf was untraceable.
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been
classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive
on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification
was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal
Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began
response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004.
Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the
index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA
and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index
herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels
well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was
thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05.
The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not
present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person
who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and
could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a
search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not
result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received
one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order
on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05.
There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and
Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of
interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have
died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A
final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest
at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been
exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold
order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received
two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67
head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory,
the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth
cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive.
Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not
found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on
Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the
identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified
as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace
Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This
herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was
conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner
of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further
information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the
livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by
that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest.
Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd
had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the
history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted.
The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an
animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7
contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State,
including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough
place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in
2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of
interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded
herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to
locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was
subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may
have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The
hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
Tuesday, November 02, 2010
*** BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex
only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992
THE SECRET MAD COW POSITIVE TEST, THAT WAS COVERED UP
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
end...tss
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?
SNIP...
What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare
disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown,
one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the
National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base
that statement.”
“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an
official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi
State.
In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the
origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said
The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a
spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.
SNIP...
Saturday, August 4, 2012
*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012
in the url that follows, I have posted
SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.
then
MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until
2007, when they ceased posting them.
then,
MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.
Friday, May 18, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
PLEASE SEE LATEST SCIENCE ON SPORADIC CJD POTENTIAL LINKS TO DIFFERENT
ANIMAL TSE PRION DISEASE ;
sporadic CJD now linked to c-BSE, L type BASE BSE (CALIFORNIA), Scrapie,
and atypical Scrapie, with much concern about CWD
***Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the
third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation
periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni,
Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys
Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies
reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The
transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that
an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the
absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a
transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are
reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD
summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first
evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic
potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for
BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their
phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to
assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid
origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
***We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical
scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, with
features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit
requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE.
***Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the
third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies
and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk
assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...TSS
===============
2014
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice
overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may
result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical
similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype
at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and
another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].
snip...
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
snip...
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that
some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type
Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME)
and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that
could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC ***
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***
the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed
investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to
European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The
specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear
largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where
other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.
Sunday, December 14, 2014
*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report ***
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
Report on the monitoring and testing of ruminants for the presence of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in the EU in 2013 Final version
18 May 2015
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves
Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle
Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia
Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1,
Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature
Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821
Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014
Abstract
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. ***The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. ***These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions.
Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to
nonhuman primates.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep
and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were
exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known
infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed
to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus
of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the
two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively.
Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed
to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru
has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under
observation.
snip...
The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie
by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further
grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in
humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is
transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been
transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977)
conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and
transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S.
Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit
scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human
or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is
emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical
to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be
transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory
personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat"
policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep
industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.
Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).
Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.
Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0
Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)
C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes
of Health, Bethesda, Maryland
SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey
(Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time
of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal
developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and
myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial
hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of
grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss
mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral
passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton,
Berkshire).
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***
*** IATROGENIC vpspr-sgss-sffi-tse-prion what if ? ***
BETTER LATE THAN NEVER...TSEAC still asleep at the wheel???---...tss
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee TSEAC MEETING
SCHEDULED FOR June 1, 2015
TSE Prion and blood transfusion: will there be additional cases? this
should be the concern. ...TSS
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Variant CJD and blood transfusion: are there additional cases?
Vox Sanguinis (2014) 107, 220–225 ORIGINAL PAPER © 2014 International
Society of Blood Transfusion DOI: 10.1111/vox.12161
Tuesday, December 30, 2014
TSEAC USA Reason For Recalls Blood products, collected from a donors
considered to be at increased risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were
distributed END OF YEAR REPORT 2014
Sunday, March 09, 2014
A Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) Lookback Study: Assessing the Risk of
Blood Borne Transmission of Classic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
FDA TSEAC CIRCUS AND TRAVELING ROAD SHOW FOR THE TSE PRION DISEASES
Sunday, June 9, 2013
TSEAC March 14, 2013: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory
Committee Meeting Webcast
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood
and blood products
Wednesday, June 29, 2011 TSEAC JUNE 2, 1999 Welcome to the FDA traveling
road show From: TSS
Subject: TSEAC JUNE 2, 1999 Welcome to the FDA traveling road show
Date: October 15, 2007 at 3:18 pm PST
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING
Thursday, June 2, 1999
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting
Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011 Posted: 3/2/2011
October 28, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting
Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011
Monday, February 7, 2011
FDA’s Currently-Recommended Policies to Reduce the Possible Risk of
Transmission of CJD and vCJD by Blood and Blood Products 2011 ???
October 29, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting
Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011
Monday, October 18, 2010
TSEAC Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Draft
Agenda and Meeting Materials,
Posted: 10/18/2010
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee
Center Date Time Location
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of
Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)
Saturday, September 5, 2009
TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June
12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)
TO : william.freas@fda.hhs.gov
May 8, 2009
Greetings again Dr. Freas, TSEAC et al,
I would kindly, once again, wish to comment at this meeting about the
urgent actions that need to be taken asap, to the Meeting of the Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009. Due to my disability
from my neck injury, I will not be attending this meeting either, however I hope
for my submission to be read and submitted. ...
IN reply to ;
snip...see full text ;
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June
12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)
TO : william.freas@fda.hhs.gov
Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October
31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in
Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on
the FSIS website:
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to
FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns
Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S.
Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments
received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the
following points in mind:
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV
Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov
Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM
Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS
SUBMISSION
snip...
ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear
with me)
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with
human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species
to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in
deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that
sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie
documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which
have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a
frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life
around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my
opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long
and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.
These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive
research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the
answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of
transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only
this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless
exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless
deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies
with primates and rodents and other species. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
snip... 48 pages...
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
TSEAC MEETINGS
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV
Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 1:24 PM
Subject: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006
[TSSSUBMISSION]November 29, 2006
Greetings FDA, DHH, Dr. Freas, and Dr. Harvey et al,
a kind and warm Holiday Greetings to you all.i kindly wish to submit the
following to the TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006, about
the assessment for potential exposure to vCJD in human
plasma-derivedantihemophilic factor (FVIII) productsmanufactured from U.S.
plasma donors and related communication material ;
i see the media picked up on this as a 'low risk', from what the gov.
agency perceived to be to them;
however, i seem to disagree. from my primitive ciphering, i see it another
way. this is a huge catastrophic risk. 3 in 160 is 1.9%. so call that 2% which
is 1 in 50 or twenty per thousand or 20,000 per million. also, wha tabout the
mixed genotypes/mixed susceptibility?
what about the silent carriers that donated tainted blood?
what about the sporadic CJDs of UNKNOWN strain or phenotype?
this risk assessment is just more BSe to me. just another in a long line of
industry fed crap. i pray that my assessment is the one that is wrong. but it is
THEY who roll the dice with your life. it is THEY who refuse to regulate an
industry that has run amok. just from are call aspect of potentially tainted
blood, and these are just recent recalls ; ...SNIP...END...TSS
*** IATROGENIC vpspr-sgss-sffi-tse-prion what if ? ***
Saturday, September 21, 2013
CJD CONFIRMED in patient at New Hampshire Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), Catholic Medical Center (CMC), and the Manchester Health
Department (MHD)
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings Last
updated 15 May 2015
Miss Storms, Olympus et al stated ;
>>> As duodenoscopes do not contact tissue at high risk associated
with CJD, ...snip...end <<<
BUT, duodenoscopes DO contact medium to low dose TSE prion infections
tissues, if the person being scoped is silently harboring a CJD TSE prion, thus
exposing everyone after that to the CJD TSE prion disease. I am very well aware
of the old study by Gibbs et al, and those brain electrodes ;
Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a chimpanzee by electrodes
contaminated during neurosurgery.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP, Gajdusek DC.
Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD
20892.
Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the cerebral cortex of a
middle aged woman with progressive dementia were previously implicated in the
accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) to two younger
patients. The diagnoses of CJD have been confirmed for all three cases. More
than two years after their last use in humans, after three cleanings and
repeated sterilisation in ethanol and formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were
implanted in the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the animal became
ill with CJD. This finding serves to re-emphasise the potential danger posed by
reuse of instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform
encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to clean them.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8006664&dopt=Abstract
regardless of how many lives endoscopy equipment saves ever year, I
strongly, strenuously, urge Olympus to warn their product users, and consumers,
that there is NO KNOWN way to date, that will completely clean and decontaminate
the endoscopy equipment from the CJD TSE prion disease, and they risk exposure
to this agent when exposed to endoscopy equipment. anything less than that would
be criminal in my opinion, with the documented science to date. these atypical
strains of TSE prion disease are mutating, and as they mutate, they can, and
have, become more virulent.
with the emergence of atypical strains of TSE prion in animals and humans,
we cannot wait to prove a negative, while exposing millions waiting on that
negative to come. the science to date, in my opinion, has shown us that this
negative has not, and is not coming, thus, exposure, and friendly fire, i.e.
iatrogenic, is the key to the 85%+ of all human TSE, i.e. sporadic CJD, and once
the science is finally peeled all the way back, biomarkers of some sorts are
discovered, and trace back of iatrogenic events are finally able to be
documented and traced back to source, I believe that companies like Olympus,
that chose to continue to expose millions, regardless of these facts, will be
left for much litigation.
I strongly urge Olympus et al to state plainly these risk factors of their
equipment to the CJD TSE prion like disease, for all to know and see, ASAP. ...
thank you, with kind regards, terry
Saturday, January 16, 2010
*** Evidence For CJD TSE Transmission Via Endoscopes 1-24-3 re-Singeltary
to Bramble et al ***
Evidence For CJD/TSE Transmission Via Endoscopes
From Terry S. Singletary, Sr flounder@wt.net 1-24-3
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., P.O. BOX 42, Bacliff, Texas 77518 USA
Professor Michael Farthing wrote:
Louise Send this to Bramble (author) for a comment before we post. Michael
snip...
Evidence For CJD/TSE Transmission Via Endoscopes
From Terry S. Singletary, Sr flounder@wt.net 1-24-3
I have researched human/animal TSEs now for over 5 years due to the death
of my Mother from the Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease, one of six -
known - variants of the infamous 'sporadic' CJD.
I did a little survey several years ago about CJD and ENDOSCOPY in 2001,
and then went there again when another article was released recently. However,
they seemed to only be concerned with the vCJD strain and risk from endoscopy
equipment.
My concerns are if vCJD can be transmitted by blood, and there are now 6
variants of the infamous sporadic CJDs that they are documenting to date, how do
they know that none of these 6 variants will not transmit the agent (prion) via
blood?...especially since the sporadic CJDs are the only ones documented to date
to transmit via the surgical arena and now that the CWD is spreading more and
more, who knows about the cattle?
I would always read this study and it would bring me back to reality as to
how serious/dangerous this agent is in the surgical/medical arena. You might
want to read this short abstract from the late, great Dr. Gibbs twice, and let
it really sink in. And please remember while reading some of these transmission
studies, that most all, if not ALL these agents transmit freely to primates.
Humans, of course, are primates.
Regarding claims that:
'Well, it has never been documented to transmit to humans."
There are two critical factors to think about:
A. CJD/TSEs in the USA are NOT reportable in most states and there is NO
CJD/TSE questionnaire for most victims and their families, and the one they are
now issuing asks absolutely nothing about route and source of the (prion) agent,
only how the disease was diagnosed. Furthermore, the elderly are only very
rarely autopsied, ie looking for Alzheimer's or 'FAST Alzheimer's' OR prion
disease-related factors and phenomena, such as heart failure caused by
disease.
B. It is unethical and against the law to do transmission studies of TSEs
to humans, they are 100% FATAL.
I suggest you read these case studies about medical arena CJD transmission
very carefully:
1: J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1994 Jun;57(6):757-8
Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a chimpanzee by electrodes
contaminated during neurosurgery.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP, Gajdusek DC.
Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD
20892.
Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the cerebral cortex of a
middle aged woman with progressive dementia were previously implicated in the
accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) to two younger
patients. The diagnoses of CJD have been confirmed for all three cases. More
than two years after their last use in humans, after three cleanings and
repeated sterilisation in ethanol and formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were
implanted in the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the animal became
ill with CJD. This finding serves to re-emphasise the potential danger posed by
reuse of instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform
encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to clean them.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8006664&dopt=Abstract
Tissue Infectivity and TSEs (brain = high / rectum = medium)
snip...see full text ;
Evidence For CJD TSE Transmission Via Endoscopes 1-24-3
re-Singeltary to Bramble et al
Evidence For CJD/TSE Transmission Via Endoscopes
From Terry S. Singletary, Sr flounder@wt.net 1-24-3
Subject: CJD * Olympus Endoscope
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 1999 16:41:49 –0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Saturday, February 21, 2015
Design of Endoscopic Retrograde Cholangiopancreatography (ERCP)
Duodenoscopes May Impede Effective Cleaning: FDA Safety Communication
Wednesday, September 10, 2014
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (August 2014), with updated
guidance on decontamination of gastrointestinal endoscopy equipment
Research and analysis
Tuesday, August 26, 2014
Blood reference materials from macaques infected with variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease agent
Thursday, June 04, 2015
Catholic Medical Center v. Civil No. 14-cv-180-JL Opinion No. 2015 DNH 110
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease TSE Prion tainted
medical instruments
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Sunday, July 12, 2015
Insights into CWD and BSE species barriers using real-time conversion
Friday, July 10, 2015
CANADA TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION UPDATE
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
Report on the monitoring and testing of ruminants for the presence of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in the EU in 2013 Final version
18 May 2015
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease
*** Kuru Video
Kuru: The Science and The Sorcery
*** Scrapie Video
*** Human Mad Cow Video
*** USA sporadic CJD MAD COW DISEASE HAS HUGE PROBLEM Video
2014
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice
overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may
result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical
similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype
at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and
another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].
snip...
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
snip...
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that
some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type
Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME)
and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that
could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***
Monday, November 3, 2014
USA CJD TSE PRION UNIT, TEXAS, SURVEILLANCE UPDATE NOVEMBER 2014
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1
(October 7, 2014)
***6 Includes 11 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 19
inconclusive cases;
***7 Includes 12 (11 from 2014) cases with type determination pending in
which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.
***The sporadic cases include 2660 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (sCJD),
***50 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr)
***and 21 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI).
Thursday, January 15, 2015
41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE
Prion: Case Report
Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies
diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type
disease
what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the
public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.
why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping
everything the USDA inc says.
sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and
there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.
My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky
Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.
with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you
Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the
Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am
seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years
and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or
what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other
meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how
many bodies is this market worth?
Saturday, January 17, 2015
*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed
with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report ***
*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis VIDEO
Alzheimer’s a TSE prion disease ??? what if ???
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net
Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential
Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease
Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3,
2014
*** Singeltary comment ***
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14,
2001 JAMA
snip...
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
TWO Escaped Captive Deer on the loose in Eau Claire County Wisconsin CWD
postive farm Yellow ear tag
Tuesday, July 21, 2015
Texas CWD Medina County Herd Investigation Update July 16, 2015
kind regards, terry
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Galveston Bay...Bacliff, Texas 77518
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