Thursday, August 20, 2015

TEXAS TAHC DEER BREEDER CWD PERMIT RULES EMERGENCY ADOPTION PREAMBLE

DEER BREEDER/CWD PERMIT RULES EMERGENCY ADOPTION PREAMBLE

1. Introduction.

Pursuant to Parks and Wildlife Code, §12.027, and Government Code, §2001.034, the executive director of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (the department) adopts, on an emergency basis, new §§65.90 - 65.93, concerning Disease Detection and Response. The new emergency rules will be constituted as new Division 2 within Chapter 65, Subchapter B, entitled Chronic Wasting Disease - Movement of Breeder Deer. Under Parks and Wildlife Code, Chapter 43, Subchapter L, the department regulates the possession of captive-raised deer within a facility for breeding purposes and the release of such deer into the wild. To the extent that any provision of the new division conflicts with any other provision of Chapter 65, the new division will prevail, except as noted.

For the reasons explained in this preamble, the department’s executive director has determined that the presence of CWD poses an immediate danger to white-tailed and mule deer, which are species authorized to be regulated by the department, and that the adoption of these rules on an emergency basis with fewer than 30 days’ notice is necessary to address this immediate danger.

On June 30, 2015, the department received confirmation that a two-year-old white-tailed deer held in a deer breeding facility in Medina County (“index facility”) had tested positive for chronic wasting disease (CWD). Subsequent testing confirmed the presence of CWD in additional white-tailed deer at the index facility. The source of the CWD at the index facility is unknown at this time. Within the last five years, the index facility accepted deer from 30 other Texas deer breeders and transferred 835 deer to 147 separate sites (including 96 deer breeding facilities, 46 release sites, and two Deer Management Permit (DMP) facilities in Texas, as well as two destinations in Mexico). (A DMP is a permit issued by the department under rules adopted pursuant to Parks and Wildlife Code, Chapter 43, Subchapters R and R-1, that allows the temporary possession of free-ranging white-tailed or mule deer for breeding purposes.) The department estimates that more than 728 locations in Texas (including 384 deer breeders) either received deer from the index facility or received deer from a deer breeder who had received deer from the index facility, representing approximately 30% of the total number of deer breeders in the state.

As provided in the Texas Administrative Code, the emergency rules will initially be in effect for no longer than 120 days, but may be extended for an additional 60 days. It is the intent of the department to also publish proposed rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment rulemaking process.

The emergency rules impose CWD testing requirements and movement restrictions for white-tailed deer and mule deer held under the authority of deer breeder’s permits issued by the department. The new rules are a result of cooperation between the department and the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) to protect susceptible species of exotic and native wildlife from CWD. TAHC is the state agency authorized to manage “any disease or agent of transmission for any disease that affects livestock, exotic livestock, domestic fowl, or exotic fowl, regardless of whether the disease is communicable, even if the agent of transmission is an animal species that is not subject to the jurisdiction” of TAHC. Tex. Agric. Code §161.041(b).

CWD is a fatal neurodegenerative disorder that affects some cervid species, including white-tailed deer, mule deer, elk, red deer, sika, and their hybrids (susceptible species). It is classified as a TSE (transmissible spongiform encephalopathy), a family of diseases that includes scrapie (found in sheep), bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, found in cattle and commonly known as “Mad Cow Disease”), and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) in humans. Much remains unknown about CWD. The peculiarities of its transmission (how it is passed from animal to animal), infection rate (the frequency of occurrence through time or other comparative standard), incubation period (the time from exposure to clinical manifestation), and potential for transmission to other species are still being investigated; however, there is no scientific evidence to indicate that CWD is transmissible to humans. What is known is that CWD is invariably fatal, and is transmitted both directly (through deer-to-deer contact) and indirectly (through environmental contamination). Moreover, a high prevalence of the disease in wild populations correlates with deer population declines and there is evidence that hunters tend to avoid areas of high CWD prevalence. The implications of CWD for Texas and its multi-billion dollar ranching, hunting, and wildlife management economies are expected to be significant, unless contained and controlled.

The department has engaged in several rulemakings over the years to address the threat posed by CWD. In 2005, the department closed the Texas border to the entry of out-of-state captive white-tailed and mule deer and increased regulatory requirements regarding disease monitoring and record keeping. (The closing of the Texas border to entry of out-of-state captive white-tailed and mule deer was updated, effective in January 2010, to address other disease threats to white-tailed and mule deer (35 TexReg 252).)

On July 10, 2012, the department confirmed that two mule deer sampled in the Texas portion of the Hueco Mountains tested positive for CWD. In response, the department and the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) convened the CWD Task Force, comprised of wildlife-health professionals and cervid producers, to advise the department on the appropriate measures to be taken to protect white-tailed and mule deer in Texas. Based on recommendations from the CWD Task Force, the department adopted new rules in 2013 (37 TexReg 10231) to implement a CWD containment strategy in far West Texas. The rules among other things require deer harvested in a specific geographical area to be presented at check stations to be tested for CWD.

The department has been concerned for over a decade about the possible emergence of CWD in wild and captive deer populations in Texas. Since 2002, more than 28,209 “not detected” CWD test results were obtained from free- ranging (i.e., not breeder) deer in Texas. Deer breeders have submitted 12,759 “not detected” test results to the department. The intent of the new emergency rules is to reduce the probability of CWD being spread from facilities where it might exist and to increase the probability of detecting CWD if it does exist.

The new emergency rules therefore set forth specific testing requirements for deer breeders, which would have to be satisfied in order to move deer to other deer breeders or for purposes of release. The new emergency rules also impose similar testing requirements on sites where breeder deer are liberated (release sites). The other significant component of the rules is that they restrict the release of breeder deer solely to enclosures surrounded by a fence of at least seven feet in height and that is capable of retaining deer at all times. Because deer held under deer breeder’s permits are frequently liberated for stocking and/or hunting purposes (27,684 in 2014), the potential for disease transmission to free-ranging deer is significant, given that the source of CWD in the index facility is unknown and the large number of deer that have been moved to other breeding facilities and/or released to the wild. The emergency action is necessary to protect the state’s white-tailed and mule deer populations, as well as the associated hunting and deer breeding industries. To minimize the severity of biological and economic impacts resulting from CWD, the rules implement a more rigorous testing protocol within certain deer breeding facilities and at certain release sites. The new emergency rules allow most breeder deer to continue to be released because the department believes that the need to protect free-ranging populations must be balanced with the interests of the more than 1,300 deer breeders in the state.

The rules are adopted on an emergency basis under Parks and Wildlife Code, §12.027, which authorizes the department’s executive director to adopt emergency rules if there is an immediate danger to a species authorized to be regulated by the department, and under Government Code §2001.034, which authorizes a state agency to adopt such emergency rules without prior notice or hearing. In addition, Parks and Wildlife Code, Chapter 43, Subchapter L, authorizes the department to regulate the possession of white-tailed and mule deer for scientific, management, and propagation purposes.

§65.90. Definitions. The following words and terms shall have the following meanings, except in cases where the context clearly indicates otherwise.

(1) Accredited testing facility--A laboratory approved by the United States Department of Agriculture to test white-tailed deer or mule deer for CWD.

(2) Breeder deer--A white-tailed deer or mule deer possessed under a permit issued by the department pursuant to Parks and Wildlife Code, Chapter 43, Subchapter L, and Subchapter T of this chapter.

(3) CWD--chronic wasting disease.

(4) CWD-positive facility--A facility where CWD has been confirmed.

(5) Deer breeder--A person who holds a valid deer breeder’s permit issued pursuant to Parks and Wildlife Code, Chapter 43, Subchapter L, and Subchapter T of this chapter.

(6) Deer breeding facility (breeding facility)--A facility permitted to hold breeder deer under a permit issued by the department pursuant to Parks and Wildlife Code, Chapter 43, Subchapter L, and Subchapter T of this chapter.

(7) Department (department)--Texas Parks and Wildlife Department

(8) Eligible mortality-- A breeder deer that has died within a deer breeding facility and:

(A) is 16 months of age or older; or

(B) if the deer breeding facility is enrolled in the TAHC CWD Herd Certification Program, is 12-months of age or older.

(9) Exposed deer--A white-tailed deer or mule deer that:

(A) is in a CWD-positive facility; or

(B) was in a CWD-positive facility within the five years preceding the confirmation of CWD in that facility.

(10) Hunter-harvested deer--A deer required to be tagged under the provisions of Subchapter A of this chapter (relating to Statewide Hunting Proclamation).

(11) Landowner (owner)--Any person who has an ownership interest in a tract of land, and includes a landowner’s authorized agent.

(12) Landowner’s authorized agent--A person designated by a landowner to act on the landowner’s behalf.

(13) NUES tag--An ear tag approved by the United States Department of Agriculture for use in the National Uniform Eartagging System (NUES).

(14) Originating facility-- A facility that is registered in TWIMS and is authorized to transfer breeder deer.

(15) Reconciled herd--The deer held in a breeding facility for which the department has determined that the deer breeder has accurately reported every birth, mortality, and transfer of deer in the previous reporting year.

(16) Release site--A specific tract of land that has been approved by the department for the release of breeder deer under this division.

(17) Reporting year--For a deer breeder, the period of time from April 1 of one calendar year to March 31 of the next calendar year.

(18) RFID tag--A button-type ear tag conforming to the 840 standards of the United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal Identification Number system.

(19) Status--The level of testing required by this division for any given deer breeding facility or release site. For the transfer categories established in §65.92(b) of this title (relating to Transfer Categories and Requirements), the highest status is Transfer Category 1 (TC 1) and the lowest status is Transfer Category 3 (TC3). For the release site classes established in §65.93(b) of this title (relating to Release Sites - Qualifications and Testing Requirements), Class I is the highest status and Class III is the lowest.

(20) Tier 1 facility--A deer breeding facility that has:

(A) received an exposed deer within the previous five years; or

(B) transferred deer to a CWD-positive facility within the five-year period preceding the confirmation of CWD in the CWD-positive facility.

(21) TAHC--Texas Animal Health Commission.

(22) TAHC CWD Herd Certification Program--The disease-testing and herd management requirements set forth in 4 TAC §40.3 (relating to Herd Status Plans for Cervidae).

(23) TAHC Herd Plan--A set of requirements for disease testing and management developed by TAHC for a specific facility.

(24) TWIMS--The department’s Texas Wildlife Information Management Services (TWIMS) online application.

§65.91. General Provisions.

(a) To the extent that any provision of this division conflicts with any other provision of this chapter, this division prevails.

(b) Except as provided in this division, no live breeder deer may be transferred anywhere for any purpose.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no person shall introduce into or remove breeder deer from or allow or authorize breeder deer to be introduced into or removed from any deer breeding facility for which a CWD test result of 'detected' has been obtained from an accredited testing facility. The provisions of this subsection take effect immediately upon the notification of a CWD 'detected' test result for a deer breeding facility, and continue in effect until the department expressly authorizes the resumption of permitted activities at that facility.

(d) No exposed breeder deer may be transferred from a breeding facility unless expressly authorized in a TAHC herd plan and then only in accordance with the provisions of this division.

(e) A breeding facility or release site that receives breeder deer from an originating facility of lower status automatically assumes the status of the originating facility and becomes subject to the testing and release requirements of this division at that status.

(f) A CWD test is not valid unless it is performed by an accredited testing facility on the obex of an eligible mortality, which may be collected by anyone. A medial retropharyngeal lymph node collected from the eligible mortality by an accredited veterinarian or other person approved by the department may be submitted to an accredited testing facility for testing in addition to the obex of the eligible mortality.

(g) Unless expressly provided otherwise in this division, all applications and notifications required by this division shall be submitted electronically via TWIMS or by another method expressly authorized by the department.

(h) A person who is subject to the provisions of this division shall comply with the provisions of TAHC regulations at 4 TAC Chapter 40 (relating to Chronic Wasting Disease) that are applicable to white-tailed or mule deer.

(i) The provisions of this division that affect TC 1 facilities take effect immediately; the remaining provisions of this division take effect upon notification of deer breeders by the department or at 11:59 p.m. on August 24, 2015, whichever is sooner.

§65.92. Transfer Categories and Requirements.

(a) General.

(1) A breeding facility that is a TC 1, Transfer Category 2 (TC 2), or TC 3 facility may transfer breeder deer under a valid transfer permit that has been activated and approved by the department as provided in §65.610(e) of this title (relating to Transfer of Deer) to:

(A) another breeding facility;

(B) an approved release site as provided in §65.93 of this division (relating to Release Sites - Qualifications and Testing Requirements);

(C) a DMP facility under Chapter 65, Subchapter D of this title (relating to Deer Management Permits); or

(D) to another person for nursing purposes.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, a breeding facility is prohibited from transferring breeder deer anywhere for any purpose if:

(A) such a transfer is not authorized pursuant to a TAHC Herd Plan associated with a hold order or quarantine;

(B) “not detected” CWD test results have been submitted for less than 20% of eligible mortalities at the breeding facility since May 23, 2006;

(C) the breeding facility has an unreconciled herd inventory; or

(D) the breeding facility is not in compliance with the provisions of §65.608 of this title (relating to Annual Reports and Records).

(3) A deer breeder may not transfer a breeder deer to a Class III release site unless the deer has been tagged by attaching a button-type RFID or NUES tag approved by the department to one ear.

(4) A deer breeding facility that is permitted on or after the effective date of this division will assume the lowest status among all originating facilities from which deer are received; provided, however, a breeding facility shall not assume TC 1 status unless it meets the criteria established in subsection (b)(1) of this section.

(b) Types of Facilities.

(1) TC 1. A breeding facility is a TC 1 facility if:

(A) it is not a Tier 1 facility; and

(B) it has “fifth-year” or “certified” status in the TAHC CWD Herd Certification Program.

(2) TC 2. A breeding facility is a TC 2 facility if:

(A) it is not a Tier 1 facility; and

(B) CWD test results of “not detected” have been returned for one of the following values, whichever represents the lowest number of tested breeder deer:

i) 4.5 percent or more of the breeder deer held within the facility during the immediately preceding two reporting years, based on the average population of deer in the facility that were at least 16 months of age on March 31 of each year (including eligible mortalities for those years); or

(ii) 50 percent of all eligible mortalities from the preceding two reporting years, provided at least one eligible mortality was tested.

(3) TC 3.

(A) A breeding facility is a TC 3 facility if it is neither a TC 1 facility nor a TC 2 facility.

(B) A breeding facility may increase status from TC 3 to TC 2 if CWD test results of “not detected” have been obtained for:

(i) each breeder deer received by the breeding facility from any CWD-positive site;

(ii) each exposed breeder deer that has been transferred by the breeding facility to another breeding facility or released; and

(iii) 4.5 percent or more of the breeder deer held within the breeding facility during the immediately preceding two reporting years, based on the average population of deer in the facility that were at least 16 months of age on March 31 of each year (including eligible mortalities for those years).

(c) Breeder deer may be temporarily transferred to a veterinarian for medical care.

§65.93. Release Sites - Qualifications and Testing Requirements.

(a) General.

(1) An approved release site consists solely of the specific tract of land and acreage designated as a release site in TWIMS.

(2) All release sites must be surrounded by a fence of at least seven feet in height that is capable of retaining deer at all times. The owner of the release site is responsible for ensuring that the fence and associated infrastructure retain the deer under ordinary and reasonable circumstances.

(3) The owner of a Class II or Class III release site shall maintain a legible daily harvest log at the release site.

(A) The daily harvest log shall be on a form provided or approved by the department and shall be maintained until the report required by subparagraph (E) of this paragraph has been submitted to and acknowledged by the department. (B) For each deer harvested on the release site and tagged under the provisions of Subchapter A of this chapter (relating to Statewide Hunting Proclamation), the landowner must, on the same day that the deer is harvested, legibly enter the information required by this subparagraph in the daily harvest log.

(C) The daily harvest log shall contain the following information for each deer harvested on the release site:

(i) the name and hunting license or driver’s license number of the person who harvested the deer;

(ii) the date the deer was harvested;

(iii) the species (white-tailed or mule deer) and type of deer harvested (buck or antlerless);

(iv) any alphanumeric identifier tattooed on the deer;

(v) any RFID or NUES tag number of any RFID or NUES tag affixed to the deer; and

(vi) any other identifier and identifying number on the deer.

(D) The daily harvest log shall be made available upon request to any department employee acting in the performance of official duties.

(E) By not later than March 15 of each year, the owner of a release site shall submit the contents of the daily harvest log to the department via TWIMS or other format authorized by the department.

(4) Release site status cannot be altered by the sale or subdivision of a property if the purpose of the sale or subdivision is to avoid the requirements of this division.

(5) The owner of a release site agrees, by consenting to the release of breeder deer on the release site, to submit all required CWD test results to the department as soon as possible but not later than May 1, 2016. Failure to comply with this paragraph will result in the release site being declared ineligible to be a destination for future releases for a period of five years.

(6) No person may intentionally cause or allow any live deer to leave or escape from a release site.

(b) Types of Release Sites

(1) Class I.

(A) A release site is a Class I release site if after July 1, 2015, it:

(i) is not a Tier 1 facility; and

(ii) receives breeder deer only from TC 1 facilities.

(B) There are no testing requirements for a Class I release site.

(2) Class II.

(A) A release site is a Class II release site if, after July 1, 2015, it:

(i) is not a Tier 1 facility;

(ii) receives any breeder deer from TC 2 facility; and

(iii) receives no deer from a TC 3 facility.

(B) The landowner of a Class II release site must obtain valid CWD test results for one of the following values, whichever represents the lowest number of deer tested:

(i) if deer are hunter-harvested, a number of deer equivalent to 50 percent of the number of breeder deer released at the site between the effective date of this division and the end of any open season for deer established for the site under this chapter; or

(ii) 50 percent of all hunter-harvested deer.

(C) If any hunter-harvested deer were breeder deer released between the effective date of this division and the end of any open season for deer established for the site under this chapter, 50 percent of those hunter-harvested deer must be submitted for CWD testing, which may be counted to satisfy the requirements of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.

(d) Class III.

(1) A release site is a Class III release site if, after July 1, 2015, it receives deer from an originating facility that is a TC 3 facility.

(2) The landowner of a Class III release site must obtain valid CWD test results for one of the following values, whichever represents the greatest number of deer tested:

(A) 100% of all hunter-harvested deer; or

(B) one hunter-harvested deer per breeder deer released between the effective date of this division and the end of any open season for deer established for the site under this chapter.



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you don’t want a test that will only detect some cwd cases, while missing others.

if I am not mistaken, and since TAHC will not officially confirm on their site the 4th case of captive CWD, or others, evidently we all are not privileged enough to know all the information to date about this Medina Captive Breeder and just how many cases of CWD there really are to date, but at least one of the 4 deer that has tested positive in the index facility had negative biopsies, from what I have read online.

also, it’s very disturbing still, how the TAHC et al are communicating with the public on this explosive CWD TSE prion disease situation in Texas. of course, TAHC will say nothing explosive about it, all is well, and no risk from trace out herd, carry on. and all this downplaying, like the decades of downplaying before, will only help to spread the disease, by not promptly educating the public on CWD TSE Prion disease. TAHC, when it comes to mad cow type disease, they use the old DUMB IT DOWN on communicating to the public. now, communicating with the industry, that’s a different story, but this is all too typical of the TAHC et al. ...just saying.

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Article Citation: (2015)

AGE AND REPEATED BIOPSY INFLUENCE ANTEMORTEM PRPCWD TESTING IN MULE DEER (ODOCOILEUS HEMIONUS) IN COLORADO, USA.

Journal of Wildlife Diseases In-Press. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.7589/2014-12-284

Ahead of Print

AGE AND REPEATED BIOPSY INFLUENCE ANTEMORTEM PRPCWD TESTING IN MULE DEER (ODOCOILEUS HEMIONUS) IN COLORADO, USA

Chris Geremia1,6,7 Jennifer A. Hoeting2, Lisa L. Wolfe3, Nathan L. Galloway4, Michael F. Antolin4, Terry R. Spraker5, Michael W. Miller3, and N. Thompson Hobbs1

1 Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory, Graduate Degree Program in Ecology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, 80523-1499, USA

2 Department of Statistics, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523, USA

3 Colorado Division of Parks and Wildlife, Wildlife Health Program, 4330 Laporte Avenue, Fort Collins, Colorado 80521, USA

4 Department of Biology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523-1878, USA

5 Colorado State University Diagnostics Laboratory, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523, USA

Key words: Bayesian, capture–mark–recapture, chronic wasting disease, mule deer, prion, test sensitivity

Abstract

Biopsy of rectal-mucosa associated lymphoid tissue provides a useful, but imperfect, live-animal test for chronic wasting disease (CWD) in mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus). It is difficult and expensive to complete these tests on free-ranging animals, and wildlife health managers will benefit from methods that can accommodate test results of varying quality. To this end, we developed a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate the probability that an individual is infected based on test results. Our model was estimated with the use of data on 210 adult female mule deer repeatedly tested during 2010−2014. The ability to identify infected individuals correctly declined with age and may have been influenced by repeated biopsy. Fewer isolated lymphoid follicles (where PrPCWD accumulates) were obtained in biopsies of older deer and the proportion of follicles showing PrPCWD was reduced. A deer’s genotype in the prion gene (PRNP) also influenced detection. At least five follicles were needed in a biopsy to assure a 95% accurate test in PRNP genotype 225SS deer.

Received: December 15, 2014; Accepted: April 23, 2015

6 Current address: Yellowstone Center for Resources, P.O. Box 168, Yellowstone National Park, Mammoth Hot Springs, Wyoming 82190, USA

7 Corresponding author (email: chris_geremia@nps.gov)



Longitudinal Detection of Prion Shedding in Saliva and Urine by Chronic Wasting Disease-Infected Deer by Real-Time Quaking-Induced Conversion

Davin M. Henderson, Nathaniel D. Denkers, Clare E. Hoover, Nina Garbino, Candace K. Mathiason and Edward A. Hoover Prion Research Center, Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pathology, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA

K. L. Beemon, Editor

+ Author Affiliations

ABSTRACT

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an emergent, rapidly spreading prion disease of cervids. Shedding of infectious prions in saliva and urine is thought to be an important factor in CWD transmission. To help to elucidate this issue, we applied an in vitro amplification assay to determine the onset, duration, and magnitude of prion shedding in longitudinally collected saliva and urine samples from CWD-exposed white-tailed deer. We detected prion shedding as early as 3 months after CWD exposure and sustained shedding throughout the disease course. We estimated that the 50% lethal dose (LD50) for cervidized transgenic mice would be contained in 1 ml of infected deer saliva or 10 ml of urine. Given the average course of infection and daily production of these body fluids, an infected deer would shed thousands of prion infectious doses over the course of CWD infection. The direct and indirect environmental impacts of this magnitude of prion shedding on cervid and noncervid species are surely significant.

IMPORTANCE Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an emerging and uniformly fatal prion disease affecting free-ranging deer and elk and is now recognized in 22 U.S. states and 2 Canadian provinces. It is unique among prion diseases in that it is transmitted naturally through wild populations. A major hypothesis to explain CWD's florid spread is that prions are shed in excreta and transmitted via direct or indirect environmental contact. Here we use a rapid in vitro assay to show that infectious doses of CWD prions are in fact shed throughout the multiyear disease course in deer. This finding is an important advance in assessing the risks posed by shed CWD prions to animals as well as humans.

FOOTNOTES Received 14 May 2015. Accepted 23 June 2015. Accepted manuscript posted online 1 July 2015. Address correspondence to Edward A. Hoover, edward.hoover@colostate.edu.

D.M.H. and N.D.D. contributed equally to this article.

Citation Henderson DM, Denkers ND, Hoover CE, Garbino N, Mathiason CK, Hoover EA. 2015. Longitudinal detection of prion shedding in saliva and urine by chronic wasting disease-infected deer by real-time quaking-induced conversion. J Virol 89:9338–9347. doi:10.1128/JVI.01118-15.



Insights into Chronic Wasting Disease and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Species Barriers by Use of Real-Time Conversion

Kristen A. Davenport, Davin M. Henderson, Jifeng Bian, Glenn C. Telling, Candace K. Mathiason and Edward A. Hoover Prion Research Center, Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA

K. L. Beemon, Editor

+ Author Affiliations

ABSTRACT

The propensity for transspecies prion transmission is related to the structural characteristics of the enciphering and new host PrP, although the exact mechanism remains incompletely understood. The effects of variability in prion protein on cross-species prion transmission have been studied with animal bioassays, but the influence of prion protein structure versus that of host cofactors (e.g., cellular constituents, trafficking, and innate immune interactions) remains difficult to dissect. To isolate the effects of protein-protein interactions on transspecies conversion, we used recombinant PrPC and real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuIC) and compared chronic wasting disease (CWD) and classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (cBSE) prions. To assess the impact of transmission to a new species, we studied feline CWD (fCWD) and feline BSE (i.e., feline spongiform encephalopathy [FSE]). We cross-seeded fCWD and FSE into each species' full-length, recombinant PrPC and measured the time required for conversion to the amyloid (PrPRes) form, which we describe here as the rate of amyloid conversion. These studies revealed the following: (i) CWD and BSE seeded their homologous species' PrP best; (ii) fCWD was a more efficient seed for feline rPrP than for white-tailed deer rPrP; (iii) conversely, FSE more efficiently converted bovine than feline rPrP; (iv) and CWD, fCWD, BSE, and FSE all converted human rPrP, although not as efficiently as homologous sCJD prions. These results suggest that (i) at the level of protein-protein interactions, CWD adapts to a new species more readily than does BSE and (ii) the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans may be less robust than estimated.

IMPORTANCE We demonstrate that bovine spongiform encephalopathy prions maintain their transspecies conversion characteristics upon passage to cats but that chronic wasting disease prions adapt to the cat and are distinguishable from the original prion. Additionally, we showed that chronic wasting disease prions are effective at seeding the conversion of normal human prion protein to an amyloid conformation, perhaps the first step in crossing the species barrier.

FOOTNOTES Received 3 June 2015. Accepted 1 July 2015. Accepted manuscript posted online 8 July 2015. Address correspondence to Edward A. Hoover, edward.hoover@colostate.edu.

Citation Davenport KA, Henderson DM, Bian J, Telling GC, Mathiason CK, Hoover EA. 2015. Insights into chronic wasting disease and bovine spongiform encephalopathy species barriers by use of real-time conversion. J Virol 89:9524–9531. doi:10.1128/JVI.01439-15.




================TEXAS CWD TSE PRION UPATE AUGUST 2015================

good ol boy system alive and well in the great state of Texas, protect the industry at all cost, including human and animal health.

where is the official announcement of this 4th case (or more cases), by the TAHC and or the TPWD? we’re still waiting.

why is the media having to do the TAHC and or the TPWD job, and reporting this critical information to the public domain?

of course, it took 7+ months and an act of Congress to finally confirm and announce to the public that last mad cow in Texas as well. political science as usual in Texas.

IF the state of Texas does not get serious real fast with CWD, and test all those deer, that 5 year plan is a ticking time bomb waiting to happen.

all cervid tested after slaughter, and test results must be released to the public.

the tse prion aka mad cow type disease is not your normal pathogen.

The TSE prion disease survives ashing to 600 degrees celsius, that’s around 1112 degrees farenheit.

you cannot cook the TSE prion disease out of meat.

you can take the ash and mix it with saline and inject that ash into a mouse, and the mouse will go down with TSE.

Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production as well.

the TSE prion agent also survives Simulated Wastewater Treatment Processes.

IN fact, you should also know that the TSE Prion agent will survive in the environment for years, if not decades.

you can bury it and it will not go away.

The TSE agent is capable of infected your water table i.e. Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area.

it’s not your ordinary pathogen you can just cook it out and be done with. that’s what’s so worrisome about Iatrogenic mode of transmission, a simple autoclave will not kill this TSE prion agent.
New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication
The infectious agents responsible for transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) are notoriously resistant to most physical and chemical methods used for inactivating pathogens, including heat. It has long been recognized, for example, that boiling is ineffective and that higher temperatures are most efficient when combined with steam under pressure (i.e., autoclaving). As a means of decontamination, dry heat is used only at the extremely high temperatures achieved during incineration, usually in excess of 600°C. It has been assumed, without proof, that incineration totally inactivates the agents of TSE, whether of human or animal origin.

 


 

Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production

 

Histochemical analysis of hamster brains inoculated with the solid residue showed typical spongiform degeneration and vacuolation. Re-inoculation of these brains into a new cohort of hamsters led to onset of clinical scrapie symptoms within 75 days, suggesting that the specific infectivity of the prion protein was not changed during the biodiesel process. The biodiesel reaction cannot be considered a viable prion decontamination method for MBM, although we observed increased survival time of hamsters and reduced infectivity greater than 6 log orders in the solid MBM residue. Furthermore, results from our study compare for the first time prion detection by Western Blot versus an infectivity bioassay for analysis of biodiesel reaction products. We could show that biochemical analysis alone is insufficient for detection of prion infectivity after a biodiesel process.

 


 

Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area

 

The data presented here demonstrate that sPMCA can detect low levels of PrPCWD in the environment, corroborate previous biological and experimental data suggesting long term persistence of prions in the environment2,3 and imply that PrPCWD accumulation over time may contribute to transmission of CWD in areas where it has been endemic for decades. This work demonstrates the utility of sPMCA to evaluate other environmental water sources for PrPCWD, including smaller bodies of water such as vernal pools and wallows, where large numbers of cervids congregate and into which prions from infected animals may be shed and concentrated to infectious levels.

 


 

A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing

 

Keywords:Abattoir;bovine spongiform encephalopathy;QRA;scrapie;TSE

 

In this article the development and parameterization of a quantitative assessment is described that estimates the amount of TSE infectivity that is present in a whole animal carcass (bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE] for cattle and classical/atypical scrapie for sheep and lambs) and the amounts that subsequently fall to the floor during processing at facilities that handle specified risk material (SRM). BSE in cattle was found to contain the most oral doses, with a mean of 9864 BO ID50s (310, 38840) in a whole carcass compared to a mean of 1851 OO ID50s (600, 4070) and 614 OO ID50s (155, 1509) for a sheep infected with classical and atypical scrapie, respectively. Lambs contained the least infectivity with a mean of 251 OO ID50s (83, 548) for classical scrapie and 1 OO ID50s (0.2, 2) for atypical scrapie. The highest amounts of infectivity falling to the floor and entering the drains from slaughtering a whole carcass at SRM facilities were found to be from cattle infected with BSE at rendering and large incineration facilities with 7.4 BO ID50s (0.1, 29), intermediate plants and small incinerators with a mean of 4.5 BO ID50s (0.1, 18), and collection centers, 3.6 BO ID50s (0.1, 14). The lowest amounts entering drains are from lambs infected with classical and atypical scrapie at intermediate plants and atypical scrapie at collection centers with a mean of 3 × 10−7 OO ID50s (2 × 10−8, 1 × 10−6) per carcass. The results of this model provide key inputs for the model in the companion paper published here.

 


 

============================================================================

 

*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years ***

 

Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3

 


 

============================================================================

 

98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 

EDITORIAL

 

Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen

 

Cristina Acín

 

Resistant prions in the environment have been the sword of Damocles for scrapie control and eradication. Attempts to establish which physical and chemical agents could be applied to inactivate or moderate scrapie infectivity were initiated in the 1960s and 1970s,with the first study of this type focusing on the effect of heat treatment in reducing prion infectivity (Hunter and Millson 1964). Nowadays, most of the chemical procedures that aim to inactivate the prion protein are based on the method developed by Kimberlin and collaborators (1983). This procedure consists of treatment with 20,000 parts per million free chlorine solution, for a minimum of one hour, of all surfaces that need to be sterilised (in laboratories, lambing pens, slaughterhouses, and so on). Despite this, veterinarians and farmers may still ask a range of questions, such as ‘Is there an official procedure published somewhere?’ and ‘Is there an international organisation which recommends and defines the exact method of scrapie decontamination that must be applied?’

 

From a European perspective, it is difficult to find a treatment that could be applied, especially in relation to the disinfection of surfaces in lambing pens of affected flocks. A 999/2001 EU regulation on controlling spongiform encephalopathies (European Parliament and Council 2001) did not specify a particular decontamination measure to be used when an outbreak of scrapie is diagnosed. There is only a brief recommendation in Annex VII concerning the control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE s).

 

Chapter B of the regulation explains the measures that must be applied if new caprine animals are to be introduced to a holding where a scrapie outbreak has previously been diagnosed. In that case, the statement indicates that caprine animals can be introduced ‘provided that a cleaning and disinfection of all animal housing on the premises has been carried out following destocking’.

 

Issues around cleaning and disinfection are common in prion prevention recommendations, but relevant authorities, veterinarians and farmers may have difficulties in finding the specific protocol which applies. The European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA ) published a detailed report about the efficacy of certain biocides, such as sodium hydroxide, sodium hypochlorite, guanidine and even a formulation of copper or iron metal ions in combination with hydrogen peroxide, against prions (EFSA 2009). The report was based on scientific evidence (Fichet and others 2004, Lemmer and others 2004, Gao and others 2006, Solassol and others 2006) but unfortunately the decontamination measures were not assessed under outbreak conditions.

 

The EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards recently published its conclusions on the scrapie situation in the EU after 10 years of monitoring and control of the disease in sheep and goats (EFSA 2014), and one of the most interesting findings was the Icelandic experience regarding the effect of disinfection in scrapie control. The Icelandic plan consisted of: culling scrapie-affected sheep or the whole flock in newly diagnosed outbreaks; deep cleaning and disinfection of stables, sheds, barns and equipment with high pressure washing followed by cleaning with 500 parts per million of hypochlorite; drying and treatment with 300 ppm of iodophor; and restocking was not permitted for at least two years. Even when all of these measures were implemented, scrapie recurred on several farms, indicating that the infectious agent survived for years in the environment, even as many as 16 years after restocking (Georgsson and others 2006).

 

In the rest of the countries considered in the EFSA (2014) report, recommendations for disinfection measures were not specifically defined at the government level. In the report, the only recommendation that is made for sheep is repopulation with sheep with scrapie-resistant genotypes. This reduces the risk of scrapie recurrence but it is difficult to know its effect on the infection.

 

Until the EFSA was established (in May 2003), scientific opinions about TSE s were provided by the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of the EC, whose advice regarding inactivation procedures focused on treating animal waste at high temperatures (150°C for three hours) and high pressure alkaline hydrolysis (SSC 2003). At the same time, the TSE Risk Management Subgroup of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) in the UK published guidance on safe working and the prevention of TSE infection. Annex C of the ACDP report established that sodium hypochlorite was considered to be effective, but only if 20,000 ppm of available chlorine was present for at least one hour, which has practical limitations such as the release of chlorine gas, corrosion, incompatibility with formaldehyde, alcohols and acids, rapid inactivation of its active chemicals and the stability of dilutions (ACDP 2009).

 

In an international context, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not recommend a specific disinfection protocol for prion agents in its Terrestrial Code or Manual. Chapter 4.13 of the Terrestrial Code, General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection (OIE 2014), focuses on foot-and-mouth disease virus, mycobacteria and Bacillus anthracis, but not on prion disinfection. Nevertheless, the last update published by the OIE on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (OIE 2012) indicates that few effective decontamination techniques are available to inactivate the agent on surfaces, and recommends the removal of all organic material and the use of sodium hydroxide, or a sodium hypochlorite solution containing 2 per cent available chlorine, for more than one hour at 20ºC.

 

The World Health Organization outlines guidelines for the control of TSE s, and also emphasises the importance of mechanically cleaning surfaces before disinfection with sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite for one hour (WHO 1999).

 

Finally, the relevant agencies in both Canada and the USA suggest that the best treatments for surfaces potentially contaminated with prions are sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite at 20,000 ppm. This is a 2 per cent solution, while most commercial household bleaches contain 5.25 per cent sodium hypochlorite. It is therefore recommended to dilute one part 5.25 per cent bleach with 1.5 parts water (CDC 2009, Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2013).

 

So what should we do about disinfection against prions? First, it is suggested that a single protocol be created by international authorities to homogenise inactivation procedures and enable their application in all scrapie-affected countries. Sodium hypochlorite with 20,000 ppm of available chlorine seems to be the procedure used in most countries, as noted in a paper summarised on p 99 of this issue of Veterinary Record (Hawkins and others 2015). But are we totally sure of its effectiveness as a preventive measure in a scrapie outbreak? Would an in-depth study of the recurrence of scrapie disease be needed?

 

What we can conclude is that, if we want to fight prion diseases, and specifically classical scrapie, we must focus on the accuracy of diagnosis, monitoring and surveillance; appropriate animal identification and control of movements; and, in the end, have homogeneous and suitable protocols to decontaminate and disinfect lambing barns, sheds and equipment available to veterinarians and farmers. Finally, further investigations into the resistance of prion proteins in the diversity of environmental surfaces are required.

 

References

 

snip...

 

98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 


 

Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following cleaning and decontamination

 

Steve A. C. Hawkins, MIBiol, Pathology Department1, Hugh A. Simmons, BVSc MRCVS, MBA, MA Animal Services Unit1, Kevin C. Gough, BSc, PhD2 and Ben C. Maddison, BSc, PhD3 + Author Affiliations

 

1Animal and Plant Health Agency, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK 2School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK 3ADAS UK, School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK E-mail for correspondence: ben.maddison@adas.co.uk Abstract Scrapie of sheep/goats and chronic wasting disease of deer/elk are contagious prion diseases where environmental reservoirs are directly implicated in the transmission of disease. In this study, the effectiveness of recommended scrapie farm decontamination regimens was evaluated by a sheep bioassay using buildings naturally contaminated with scrapie. Pens within a farm building were treated with either 20,000 parts per million free chorine solution for one hour or were treated with the same but were followed by painting and full re-galvanisation or replacement of metalwork within the pen. Scrapie susceptible lambs of the PRNP genotype VRQ/VRQ were reared within these pens and their scrapie status was monitored by recto-anal mucosa-associated lymphoid tissue. All animals became infected over an 18-month period, even in the pen that had been subject to the most stringent decontamination process. These data suggest that recommended current guidelines for the decontamination of farm buildings following outbreaks of scrapie do little to reduce the titre of infectious scrapie material and that environmental recontamination could also be an issue associated with these premises.

 

SNIP...

 

Discussion

 

Thorough pressure washing of a pen had no effect on the amount of bioavailable scrapie infectivity (pen B). The routine removal of prions from surfaces within a laboratory setting is treatment for a minimum of one hour with 20,000 ppm free chlorine, a method originally based on the use of brain macerates from infected rodents to evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination (Kimberlin and others 1983). Further studies have also investigated the effectiveness of hypochlorite disinfection of metal surfaces to simulate the decontamination of surgical devices within a hospital setting. Such treatments with hypochlorite solution were able to reduce infectivity by 5.5 logs to lower than the sensitivity of the bioassay used (Lemmer and others 2004). Analogous treatment of the pen surfaces did not effectively remove the levels of scrapie infectivity over that of the control pens, indicating that this method of decontamination is not effective within a farm setting. This may be due to the high level of biological matrix that is present upon surfaces within the farm environment, which may reduce the amount of free chlorine available to inactivate any infectious prion. Remarkably 1/5 sheep introduced into pen D had also became scrapie positive within nine months, with all animals in this pen being RAMALT positive by 18 months of age. Pen D was no further away from the control pen (pen A) than any of the other pens within this barn. Localised hot spots of infectivity may be present within scrapie-contaminated environments, but it is unlikely that pen D area had an amount of scrapie contamination that was significantly different than the other areas within this building. Similarly, there were no differences in how the biosecurity of pen D was maintained, or how this pen was ventilated compared with the other pens. This observation, perhaps, indicates the slower kinetics of disease uptake within this pen and is consistent with a more thorough prion removal and recontamination. These observations may also account for the presence of inadvertent scrapie cases within other studies, where despite stringent biosecurity, control animals have become scrapie positive during challenge studies using barns that also housed scrapie-affected animals (Ryder and others 2009). The bioassay data indicate that the exposure of the sheep to a farm environment after decontamination efforts thought to be effective in removing scrapie is sufficient for the animals to become infected with scrapie. The main exposure routes within this scenario are likely to be via the oral route, during feeding and drinking, and respiratory and conjunctival routes. It has been demonstrated that scrapie infectivity can be efficiently transmitted via the nasal route in sheep (Hamir and others 2008), as is the case for CWD in both murine models and in white-tailed deer (Denkers and others 2010, 2013). Recently, it has also been demonstrated that CWD prions presented as dust when bound to the soil mineral montmorillonite can be infectious via the nasal route (Nichols and others 2013). When considering pens C and D, the actual source of the infectious agent in the pens is not known, it is possible that biologically relevant levels of prion survive on surfaces during the decontamination regimen (pen C). With the use of galvanising and painting (pen D) covering and sealing the surface of the pen, it is possible that scrapie material recontaminated the pens by the movement of infectious prions contained within dusts originating from other parts of the barn that were not decontaminated or from other areas of the farm.

 

Given that scrapie prions are widespread on the surfaces of affected farms (Maddison and others 2010a), irrespective of the source of the infectious prions in the pens, this study clearly highlights the difficulties that are faced with the effective removal of environmentally associated scrapie infectivity. This is likely to be paralleled in CWD which shows strong similarities to scrapie in terms of both the dissemination of prions into the environment and the facile mode of disease transmission. These data further contribute to the understanding that prion diseases can be highly transmissible between susceptible individuals not just by direct contact but through highly stable environmental reservoirs that are refractory to decontamination.

 

The presence of these environmentally associated prions in farm buildings make the control of these diseases a considerable challenge, especially in animal species such as goats where there is lack of genetic resistance to scrapie and, therefore, no scope to re-stock farms with animals that are resistant to scrapie.

 

Scrapie Sheep Goats Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) Accepted October 12, 2014. Published Online First 31 October 2014

 


 

Monday, November 3, 2014

 

Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following cleaning and decontamination

 


 

PPo3-22:

 

Detection of Environmentally Associated PrPSc on a Farm with Endemic Scrapie

 

Ben C. Maddison,1 Claire A. Baker,1 Helen C. Rees,1 Linda A. Terry,2 Leigh Thorne,2 Susan J. Belworthy2 and Kevin C. Gough3 1ADAS-UK LTD; Department of Biology; University of Leicester; Leicester, UK; 2Veterinary Laboratories Agency; Surry, KT UK; 3Department of Veterinary Medicine and Science; University of Nottingham; Sutton Bonington, Loughborough UK

 

Key words: scrapie, evironmental persistence, sPMCA

 

Ovine scrapie shows considerable horizontal transmission, yet the routes of transmission and specifically the role of fomites in transmission remain poorly defined. Here we present biochemical data demonstrating that on a scrapie-affected sheep farm, scrapie prion contamination is widespread. It was anticipated at the outset that if prions contaminate the environment that they would be there at extremely low levels, as such the most sensitive method available for the detection of PrPSc, serial Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (sPMCA), was used in this study. We investigated the distribution of environmental scrapie prions by applying ovine sPMCA to samples taken from a range of surfaces that were accessible to animals and could be collected by use of a wetted foam swab. Prion was amplified by sPMCA from a number of these environmental swab samples including those taken from metal, plastic and wooden surfaces, both in the indoor and outdoor environment. At the time of sampling there had been no sheep contact with these areas for at least 20 days prior to sampling indicating that prions persist for at least this duration in the environment. These data implicate inanimate objects as environmental reservoirs of prion infectivity which are likely to contribute to disease transmission.

 


 

cwd environmental load factor in the land and surrounding plants and objects.

 

transportation of cervids and HUMANS from cwd zone should be regarded as a great risk factor, and environmental contamination.

 

PL1

 

Using in vitro prion replication for high sensitive detection of prions and prionlike proteins and for understanding mechanisms of transmission.

 

Claudio Soto

 

Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's diseases and related Brain disorders, Department of Neurology, University of Texas Medical School at Houston.

 

Prion and prion-like proteins are misfolded protein aggregates with the ability to selfpropagate to spread disease between cells, organs and in some cases across individuals. I n T r a n s m i s s i b l e s p o n g i f o r m encephalopathies (TSEs), prions are mostly composed by a misfolded form of the prion protein (PrPSc), which propagates by transmitting its misfolding to the normal prion protein (PrPC). The availability of a procedure to replicate prions in the laboratory may be important to study the mechanism of prion and prion-like spreading and to develop high sensitive detection of small quantities of misfolded proteins in biological fluids, tissues and environmental samples. Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) is a simple, fast and efficient methodology to mimic prion replication in the test tube. PMCA is a platform technology that may enable amplification of any prion-like misfolded protein aggregating through a seeding/nucleation process. In TSEs, PMCA is able to detect the equivalent of one single molecule of infectious PrPSc and propagate prions that maintain high infectivity, strain properties and species specificity. Using PMCA we have been able to detect PrPSc in blood and urine of experimentally infected animals and humans affected by vCJD with high sensitivity and specificity. Recently, we have expanded the principles of PMCA to amplify amyloid-beta (Aβ) and alphasynuclein (α-syn) aggregates implicated in Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, respectively. Experiments are ongoing to study the utility of this technology to detect Aβ and α-syn aggregates in samples of CSF and blood from patients affected by these diseases.

 

=========================

 

***Recently, we have been using PMCA to study the role of environmental prion contamination on the horizontal spreading of TSEs. These experiments have focused on the study of the interaction of prions with plants and environmentally relevant surfaces. Our results show that plants (both leaves and roots) bind tightly to prions present in brain extracts and excreta (urine and feces) and retain even small quantities of PrPSc for long periods of time. Strikingly, ingestion of prioncontaminated leaves and roots produced disease with a 100% attack rate and an incubation period not substantially longer than feeding animals directly with scrapie brain homogenate. Furthermore, plants can uptake prions from contaminated soil and transport them to different parts of the plant tissue (stem and leaves). Similarly, prions bind tightly to a variety of environmentally relevant surfaces, including stones, wood, metals, plastic, glass, cement, etc. Prion contaminated surfaces efficiently transmit prion disease when these materials were directly injected into the brain of animals and strikingly when the contaminated surfaces were just placed in the animal cage. These findings demonstrate that environmental materials can efficiently bind infectious prions and act as carriers of infectivity, suggesting that they may play an important role in the horizontal transmission of the disease.

 

========================

 

Since its invention 13 years ago, PMCA has helped to answer fundamental questions of prion propagation and has broad applications in research areas including the food industry, blood bank safety and human and veterinary disease diagnosis.

 


 

see ;

 


 


 


 


 


 

*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years ***

 

Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3

 


 

 PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FT. COLLINS CWD RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS

 

 *** LATE-BREAKING ABSTRACTS PRION 2015 CONFERENCE ***

 

 O18

 

 Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions

 

 Liuting Qing1, Ignazio Cali1,2, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang3, Diane Kofskey1, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Wenquan Zou1, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 2Second University of Naples, Naples, Italy, 3Encore Health Resources, Houston, Texas, USA

 

 ***These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.***

 

 P.105: RT-QuIC models trans-species prion transmission

 

 Kristen Davenport, Davin Henderson, Candace Mathiason, and Edward Hoover Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA

 

 Additionally, human rPrP was competent for conversion by CWD and fCWD.

 

 ***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously estimated.***

 


 

 From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

 Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 9:29 PM

 

 To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

 Subject: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE R. G. WILL 1984

 

 THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE

 

 R. G. WILL

 

 1984

 

 *** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). (SEE LINK IN REPORT HERE...TSS) PLUS, THE CDC DID NOT PUT THIS WARNING OUT FOR THE WELL BEING OF THE DEER AND ELK ;

 

 snip...

 


 

 *** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***

 


 

 *** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.

 


 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations

 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France

 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. *** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, ***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), ***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), ***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.

 

===============

 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...TSS

 

===============

 


 

Wednesday, March 18, 2015

 

*** Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Confirmed Texas Trans Pecos March 18, 2015

 


 

 Wednesday, March 25, 2015

 

 *** Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Cases Confirmed In New Mexico 2013 and 2014 UPDATE 2015

 


 

 Wednesday, July 01, 2015

 

*** TEXAS Chronic Wasting Disease Detected in Medina County Captive Deer

 


 

 Tuesday, July 21, 2015

 

 *** Texas CWD Medina County Herd Investigation Update July 16, 2015 ***

 


 

 Thursday, August 06, 2015

 

*** WE HAVE LOST TEXAS TO CWD TASK FORCE CATERING TO INDUSTRY

 


 

 Friday, August 07, 2015

 

*** Texas CWD Captive, and then there were 4 ?

 


 

 TEXAS DEER CZAR SENT TO WISCONSIN TO SOLVE CWD CRISIS, WHILE ROME (TEXAS) BURNS

 

 Tuesday, August 11, 2015

 

*** Wisconsin doing what it does best, procrastinating about CWD yet again thanks to Governor Walker

 


 

 *** Danger of Canned Hunting Indiana Wildlife ***

 


 

 a review since the TEXAS 84th Legislature commencing this January, deer breeders are expected to advocate for bills that will seek to further deregulate their industry...

 

 Sunday, December 14, 2014

 

 TEXAS 84th Legislature commencing this January, deer breeders are expected to advocate for bills that will seek to further deregulate their industry

 


 

 Tuesday, December 16, 2014

 

 Texas 84th Legislature 2015 H.R. No. 2597 Kuempel Deer Breeding Industry TAHC TPWD CWD TSE PRION

 


 

 I spoke with MASTER Obi-Wan Kenobi about all this. see Obi’s reply ;

 

 GRASSHOPPER TO MASTER Obi-Wan Kenobi CWD TEXAS CAPTIVE

 

 ‘’I see no evidence whatsoever here for a genetic link. The numbers are statistically insignificant and co-housing in contaminated facilities would strongly predispose to this outcome.’’

 

 ‘’if the father did have a bad amino acid variant allele, it would be diluted to heterozygozity with a normal gene in the half the four descendants since the father never would have survived to breeding age with two bad copies. sort of like met/val at position 129 in humans with greatly lengthened incubation times if prnp is propagating at all. Mutations such as repeat expansion leading to positive dominant infection have not been documented in cervids.’’

 

 On 09 08 15, at 9:09 AM, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. wrote: ‘’

 

 cwd Texas and then there were 4?

 

 genetic link ?

 

 He said 42 deer have been killed and tested since July 28, and three additional positives were the result.

 

 ***He added that all four deer confirmed to have the disease were males from the same father, which leads him to believe the problem is genetic.

 

 snip...

 


 

 HAVE YOU BEEN THUNDERSTRUCK ?

 


 

 on my mothers grave, when I wrote up the ‘have you been thunderstruck’ about super ovulation, and what if? I had no clue about all this. hell, I had it in draft for a month. then a week or so later, bam.

 

 it’s been like this all along Obi-Wan Kenobi.

 

 every shooting pen owner in Texas are praying this familial cwd is the going thing now.

 

 no link to sperm.

 

 no link to super ovulation.

 

 they sell those sperm straws like the meth heads and crack heads sell meth and crack.

 

 genetic link with four deer in the same herd, same father ?

 

 familial ?

 

 sperm ?

 

 super ovulation ?

 

 what say ye master ?

 

 grasshopper

 

 Friday, August 07, 2015

 

 Texas CWD Captive, and then there were 4 ?

 


 

TAHC ADOPTS CWD RULE THAT the amendments remove the requirement for a specific fence height for captives

 

Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC)

 

ANNOUNCEMENT

 

October 3, 2013

 

snip...

 

Summary Minutes from 387th Commission Meeting – 9/10/2013

 

18

 

1) The first change is to the definition of “Physical Herd Inventory” to remove the requirement that all animals in the herd must be restrained in order to have the identification validated by the person performing the inventory verification.

 

2) The second modification is the fencing requirement found in §40.3(a) which provides that a herd premises must have perimeter fencing of a minimum of eight feet in height and adequate to prevent ingress or egress of cervids. That standard is found in the Uniform Method and Rules for CWD, but under the federal regulations the standard provides merely that the fencing must be adequate to prevent ingress or egress of cervids and the commission is modifying agency requirements to meet that standard by removing the eight foot requirement.

 

The motion to approve the regulation amendment passed.

 


 

> The amendments remove the requirement for a specific fence height...

 

> but under the federal regulations the standard provides merely that the fencing must be adequate to prevent ingress or egress of cervids and the commission is modifying agency requirements to meet that standard by removing the eight foot requirement.

 


 

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

 

Texas Certified Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Sample Collector, like the Wolf Guarding the Henhouse

 


 

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

 

*** Texas CWD Medina County Herd Investigation Update July 16, 2015 ***

 


 

 Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

 

 Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

 

 snip...

 

 The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

 


 

 In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

 

 3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...

 


 

 human cwd will NOT look like nvCJD. in fact, see ;

 

 *** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***

 


 

 HIGHEST INFECTION RATE ON SEVERAL CWD CONFIRMED CAPTIVES

 

 CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD WISCONSIN Almond Deer (Buckhorn Flats) Farm Update DECEMBER 2011

 

 The CWD infection rate was nearly 80%, the highest ever in a North American captive herd.

 

 RECOMMENDATION: That the Board approve the purchase of 80 acres of land for $465,000 for the Statewide Wildlife Habitat Program in Portage County and approve the restrictions on public use of the site.

 

 SUMMARY:

 


 

 For Immediate Release Thursday, October 2, 2014

 

 Dustin Vande Hoef 515/281-3375 or 515/326-1616 (cell) or Dustin.VandeHoef@IowaAgriculture.gov

 

 *** TEST RESULTS FROM CAPTIVE DEER HERD WITH CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE RELEASED 79.8 percent of the deer tested positive for the disease

 

 DES MOINES – The Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship today announced that the test results from the depopulation of a quarantined captive deer herd in north-central Iowa showed that 284 of the 356 deer, or 79.8% of the herd, tested positive for Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD).

 


 

 *** see history of this CWD blunder here ;

 


 

 On June 5, 2013, DNR conducted a fence inspection, after gaining approval from surrounding landowners, and confirmed that the fenced had been cut or removed in at least four separate locations; that the fence had degraded and was failing to maintain the enclosure around the Quarantined Premises in at least one area; that at least three gates had been opened;and that deer tracks were visible in and around one of the open areas in the sand on both sides of the fence, evidencing movement of deer into the Quarantined Premises.

 


 

 The overall incidence of clinical CWD in white-tailed deer was 82%

 

 Species (cohort) CWD (cases/total) Incidence (%) Age at CWD death (mo)

 


 

 *** Spraker suggested an interesting explanation for the occurrence of CWD. The deer pens at the Foot Hills Campus were built some 30-40 years ago by a Dr. Bob Davis. At or abut that time, allegedly, some scrapie work was conducted at this site. When deer were introduced to the pens they occupied ground that had previously been occupied by sheep.

 


 

CWD, spreading it around...

 

 for the game farm industry, and their constituents, to continue to believe that they are _NOT_, and or insinuate that they have _NEVER_ been part of the problem, will only continue to help spread cwd. the game farming industry, from the shooting pens, to the urine mills, the antler mills, the sperm mills, velvet mills, shooting pens, to large ranches, are not the only problem, but it is painfully obvious that they have been part of the problem for decades and decades, just spreading it around, as with transportation and or exportation and or importation of cervids from game farming industry, and have been proven to spread cwd. no one need to look any further than South Korea blunder ;

 

 ===========================================

 

 spreading cwd around...

 

 Between 1996 and 2002, chronic wasting disease was diagnosed in 39 herds of farmed elk in Saskatchewan in a single epidemic. All of these herds were depopulated as part of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s (CFIA) disease eradication program. Animals, primarily over 12 mo of age, were tested for the presence CWD prions following euthanasia. Twenty-one of the herds were linked through movements of live animals with latent CWD from a single infected source herd in Saskatchewan, 17 through movements of animals from 7 of the secondarily infected herds.

 

 ***The source herd is believed to have become infected via importation of animals from a game farm in South Dakota where CWD was subsequently diagnosed (7,4). A wide range in herd prevalence of CWD at the time of herd depopulation of these herds was observed. Within-herd transmission was observed on some farms, while the disease remained confined to the introduced animals on other farms.

 


 

 spreading cwd around...

 

 Friday, May 13, 2011

 

 Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) outbreaks and surveillance program in the Republic of Korea

 

 Hyun-Joo Sohn, Yoon-Hee Lee, Min-jeong Kim, Eun-Im Yun, Hyo-Jin Kim, Won-Yong Lee, Dong-Seob Tark, In- Soo Cho, Foreign Animal Disease Research Division, National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, Republic of Korea

 

 Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has been recognized as an important prion disease in native North America deer and Rocky mountain elks. The disease is a unique member of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), which naturally affects only a few species. CWD had been limited to USA and Canada until 2000.

 

 On 28 December 2000, information from the Canadian government showed that a total of 95 elk had been exported from farms with CWD to Korea. These consisted of 23 elk in 1994 originating from the so-called “source farm” in Canada, and 72 elk in 1997, which had been held in pre export quarantine at the “source farm”.Based on export information of CWD suspected elk from Canada to Korea, CWD surveillance program was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) in 2001.

 

 All elks imported in 1997 were traced back, however elks imported in 1994 were impossible to identify. CWD control measures included stamping out of all animals in the affected farm, and thorough cleaning and disinfection of the premises. In addition, nationwide clinical surveillance of Korean native cervids, and improved measures to ensure reporting of CWD suspect cases were implemented.

 

 Total of 9 elks were found to be affected. CWD was designated as a notifiable disease under the Act for Prevention of Livestock Epidemics in 2002.

 

 Additional CWD cases - 12 elks and 2 elks - were diagnosed in 2004 and 2005.

 

 Since February of 2005, when slaughtered elks were found to be positive, all slaughtered cervid for human consumption at abattoirs were designated as target of the CWD surveillance program. Currently, CWD laboratory testing is only conducted by National Reference Laboratory on CWD, which is the Foreign Animal Disease Division (FADD) of National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service (NVRQS).

 

 In July 2010, one out of 3 elks from Farm 1 which were slaughtered for the human consumption was confirmed as positive. Consequently, all cervid – 54 elks, 41 Sika deer and 5 Albino deer – were culled and one elk was found to be positive. Epidemiological investigations were conducted by Veterinary Epidemiology Division (VED) of NVRQS in collaboration with provincial veterinary services.

 

 Epidemiologically related farms were found as 3 farms and all cervid at these farms were culled and subjected to CWD diagnosis. Three elks and 5 crossbreeds (Red deer and Sika deer) were confirmed as positive at farm 2.

 

 All cervids at Farm 3 and Farm 4 – 15 elks and 47 elks – were culled and confirmed as negative.

 

 Further epidemiological investigations showed that these CWD outbreaks were linked to the importation of elks from Canada in 1994 based on circumstantial evidences.

 

 In December 2010, one elk was confirmed as positive at Farm 5. Consequently, all cervid – 3 elks, 11 Manchurian Sika deer and 20 Sika deer – were culled and one Manchurian Sika deer and seven Sika deer were found to be positive. This is the first report of CWD in these sub-species of deer. Epidemiological investigations found that the owner of the Farm 2 in CWD outbreaks in July 2010 had co-owned the Farm 5.

 

 In addition, it was newly revealed that one positive elk was introduced from Farm 6 of Jinju-si Gyeongsang Namdo. All cervid – 19 elks, 15 crossbreed (species unknown) and 64 Sika deer – of Farm 6 were culled, but all confirmed as negative.

 


 


 


 


 

SEE OLD HISTORY OF DIFFERENT STATES TRYING TO STOP THE SPREADING OF CWD VIA DEER CAPTIVE BREEDER, HUNTING FARMS ;

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

Friday, January 30, 2015

 

 *** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***

 


 

 Friday, December 14, 2012

 

 DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

 

 snip...

 

 In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

 Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

 

 1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

 

 2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 

 Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

 

 The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

 

 Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

 

 There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

 

 snip...

 

 36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

 

 snip...

 

 The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

 

 snip...

 

 In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

 

 snip...

 

 In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

 

 snip...

 

 Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

 

 snip...

 


 

 ==================================

 

 In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system.

 

 ***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

 =================================

 

 Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; CVM Updates on Deer and Elk Withdrawn FDA Veterinarian Newsletter July/August 2003 Volume XVIII, No 4

 

 snip...

 

 II. Background

 

 CWD is a neurological (brain) disease of farmed and wild deer and elk that belong in the animal family cervidae (cervids). Only deer and elk are known to be susceptible to CWD by natural transmission. The disease has been found in farmed and wild mule deer,

 

 1 This guidance has been prepared by the Division of Animal Feeds in the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) at the Food and Drug Administration.

 

 snip...

 

 III.

 

 Use in animal feed of material from CWD-positive deer and elk

 

 Material from CWD-positive animals may not be used in any animal feed or feed ingredients. Pursuant to Sec. 402(a)(5) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, animal feed and feed ingredients containing material from a CWD-positive animal would be considered adulterated. FDA recommends that any such adulterated feed or feed ingredients be recalled or otherwise removed from the marketplace.

 

 IV.

 

 Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD

 

 Deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD include: (1) animals from areas declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and (2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 

 FDA recommends that materials from deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD no longer be entered into the animal feed system. Under present circumstances, FDA is not recommending that feed made from deer and elk from a non-endemic area be recalled if a State later declares the area endemic for CWD or a CWD eradication zone. In addition, at this time, FDA is not recommending that feed made from deer and elk believed to be from a captive herd that contained no CWD-positive animals be recalled if that herd is subsequently found to contain a CWD-positive animal. V. Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD

 

 FDA continues to consider materials from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD to be acceptable for use in NON-RUMINANT animal feeds in accordance with current agency regulations, 21 CFR 589.2000. Deer and elk not considered at high risk include: (1) deer and elk from areas not declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and (2) deer and elk that were not at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 


 

 *** Singeltary reply ;

 

 ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ?

 

 31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

 *** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

 10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

 Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

 RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

 

 PRODUCT

 

 Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

 

 CODE

 

 Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

 

 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

 Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

 

 Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

 REASON

 

 Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

 VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

 42,090 lbs.

 

 DISTRIBUTION

 

 WI

 

 ___________________________________

 

 PRODUCT

 

 Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

 

 CODE

 

 The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

 

 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

 Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

 REASON

 

 Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

 VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

 9,997,976 lbs.

 

 DISTRIBUTION

 

 ID and NV

 

 END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

 *** spontaneous TSE prion, that's wishful thinking. on the other hand, if spontaneous did ever happen (never once documented in the field), it would be our worst nightmare, due to feed. just saying.

 

 *** We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. ***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

 

 >>> Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility. <<<

 


 


 

 FRANCE HAVE AN EPIDEMIC OF SPONTANEOUS ATYPICAL BSE ‘’LOL’’

 

 spontaneous atypical BSE ???

 

 if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$

 

 As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.

 


 

 so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

 

 Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

 France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

 2013

 

 Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

 FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

 Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

 FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

 Friday, November 22, 2013

 

 Wasting disease is threat to the entire UK deer population CWD TSE PRION disease in cervids

 

 ***SINGELTARY SUBMISSION

 

 The Scottish Parliament’s Rural Affairs, Climate Change and Environment Committee has been looking into deer management, as you can see from the following press release,

 

 ***and your email has been forwarded to the committee for information:

 


 


 

 Friday, November 22, 2013

 

 Wasting disease is threat to the entire UK deer population

 


 

 Sunday, July 21, 2013

 

 Welsh Government and Food Standards Agency Wales Joint Public Consultation on the Proposed Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (Wales) Regulations 2013

 

 *** Singeltary Submission WG18417

 


 

 *** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***

 

 Posted by flounder on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

 


 

 Friday, August 14, 2015

 

 Susceptibility of cattle to the agent of chronic wasting disease from elk after intracranial inoculation

 


 

 Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

 *** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

 Wednesday, July 15, 2015

 

 *** Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed?

 


 

 Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

 Further characterisation of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy phenotypes after inoculation of cattle with two temporally separated sources of sheep scrapie from Great Britain

 


 

 Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

 Porcine Prion Protein Amyloid or mad pig disease PSE

 


 

 Monday, August 10, 2015

 

 Detection and Quantification of beta-Amyloid, Pyroglutamyl A beta, and Tau in Aged Canines

 


 

 Friday, August 7, 2015

 

 Transgenic Mouse Bioassay: Evidence That Rabbits Are Susceptible to a Variety of Prion Isolates

 


 

Friday, August 14, 2015

 

*** Carcass Management During a Mass Animal Health Emergency Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement—August 2015

 


 

Thursday, August 13, 2015

 

 Iatrogenic CJD due to pituitary-derived growth hormone with genetically determined incubation times of up to 40 years

 


 

 Thursday, January 15, 2015

 

 41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE Prion: Case Report

 


 

 Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type disease

 

 what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.

 

 why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping everything the USDA inc says.

 

 sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.

 

 My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.

 

 with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how many bodies is this market worth?

 

 Saturday, January 17, 2015

 

 *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

 


 

 *** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report ***

 


 

 *** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis VIDEO

 


 


 


 


 

 Alzheimer’s, iatrogenic, what if ?

 


 

 Friday, January 10, 2014

 

 vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???

 


 

 Tuesday, August 4, 2015

 

 FDA U.S. Measures to Protect Against BSE

 


 

Monday, August 17, 2015

 

FDA Says Endoscope Makers Failed to Report Superbug Problems OLYMPUS

 

I told Olympus 15 years ago about these risk factors from endoscopy equipment, disinfection, even spoke with the Doctor at Olympus, this was back in 1999. I tried to tell them that they were exposing patients to dangerous pathogens such as the CJD TSE prion, because they could not properly clean them. even presented my concern to a peer review journal GUT, that was going to publish, but then it was pulled by Professor Michael Farthing et al... see ;

 


 

consumption there from, TSE prion disease at a hospital near you ???

 


 


 


 

Thursday, August 13, 2015

 

Iatrogenic CJD due to pituitary-derived growth hormone with genetically determined incubation times of up to 40 years

 


 

still kidding ourselves in Texas...it’s still not funny to me.

 

Singeltary trying to warn where cwd is at in Trans Pecos region 2001-2002 - 2012

 

TEXAS OLD STATISTICS BELOW FOR PAST CWD TESTING;

 

Subject: CWD testing in Texas

 

Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2002 19:45:14 –0500

 

From: Kenneth Waldrup

 

To: flounder@wt.net

 

CC: mcoats@tahc.state.tx.us

 

Dear Dr. Singletary,

 

In Fiscal Year 2001, seven deer from Texas were tested by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) for CWD (5 fallow deer and 2 white-tailed deer). In Fiscal Year 2002, seven elk from Texas were tested at NVSL (no deer). During these two years, an additional six elk and one white-tailed deer were tested at the Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory (TVMDL). In Fiscal Year 2002, four white-tailed deer (free-ranging clinical suspects) and at least eight other white-tailed deer have been tested at TVMDL. One elk has been tested at NVSL. All of these animals have been found negative for CWD. Dr. Jerry Cooke of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department also has records of 601 clinically ill white-tailed deer which were necropsied at Texas A&M during the late 1960's and early 1970's, and no spongiform encepalopathies were noted. Thank you for your consideration.

 

Ken Waldrup, DVM, PhD Texas Animal Health Commission

 

========================

 

From: Ken Waldrup, DVM, PhD (host25-207.tahc.state.tx.us)

 

Subject: Re: CWD SAMPLING TEXAS (but NOT in the obvious place, the NM, TEXAS border)

 

Date: December 15, 2003 at 3:43 pm PST

 

In Reply to: CWD SAMPLING TEXAS (but NOT in the obvious place, the NM, TEXAS border) posted by TSS on December 12, 2003 at 2:15 pm:

 

Dear sirs:

 

With regard to your comment about Texas NOT looking for CWD along the New Mexico border, it is painfully obvious that you do not know or understand the natural distribution of mule deer out there or the rights of the land owners in this state. As of 15 December 2003, a total of 42 deer had been sampled from what we call "Trans-Pecos", beyond the Pecos River. Mule deer are very widely dispersed through this area, sometimes at densities of one animal per 6 square miles. The Texas Parks and Wildlife Department does not have the legal authority to trepass on private property to collect deer. Some landowners are cooperative. Some are not. Franklin State Park is at the very tip of Texas, and deer from the park have been tested (all negative). One of the single largest land owners along the border is the National Park Service. Deer and elk from the Guadalupe Peak National Park cannot be collected with federal permission. The sampling throughout the state is based on the deer populations by eco-region and is dictated by the availability of funds. I am concerned about your insinuation that CWD is a human health risk. We are at a stand-off - you have no proof that it is and I have no definitive proof that it isn't. However I would say that the inferred evidence from Colorado, Wyoming and Wisconsin suggests that CWD is not a human health concern (i.e. no evidence of an increased incidence of human brain disorders within the CWD "endemic" areas of these states). From my professional interactions with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, I can definitely say that they want to do a thorough and sound survey throughout the state, not willy-nilly "look here, look there". There are limitations of manpower, finances and, in some places, deer populations. I would congratulate TPWD for doing the best job with the limitations at hand rather than trying to browbeat them when you obviously do not understand the ecology of West Texas. Thank you for your consideration.

 

======================

 

From: TSS (216-119-139-126.ipset19.wt.net)

 

Subject: Re: CWD SAMPLING TEXAS (but NOT in the obvious place, the NM, TEXAS border)

 

Date: December 16, 2003 at 11:03 am PST

 

In Reply to: Re: CWD SAMPLING TEXAS (but NOT in the obvious place, the NM, TEXAS border) posted by Ken Waldrup, DVM, PhD on December 15, 2003 at 3:43 pm:

 

HEllo Dr. Waldrup,

 

thank you for your comments and time to come to this board.

 

Ken Waldrup, DVM, PhD states;

 

> it is painfully obvious that you do not know or understand the natural distribution of mule deer out there or the rights of the land owners in this state...

 

TSS states;

 

I am concerned about all deer/elk not just mule deer, and the rights of land owners (in the case with human/animal TSEs) well i am not sure of the correct terminology, but when the States deer/elk/cattle/sheep/humans are at risk, there should be no rights for land owners in this case. the state should have the right to test those animals. there are too many folks out there that are just plain ignorant about this agent. with an agent such as this, you cannot let landowners (and i am one) dictate human/animal health, especially when you cannot regulate the movement of such animals...

 

Ken Waldrup, DVM, PhD states;

 

> Deer and elk from the Guadalupe Peak National Park cannot be collected with federal permission.

 

TSS states;

 

I do not understand this? so there is no recourse of action even if every deer/elk was contaminated with CWD in this area (hypothetical)?

 

Ken Waldrup, DVM, PhD states;

 

> I am concerned about your insinuation that CWD is a human health risk. We are at a stand-off - you have no proof that it is and I have no definitive proof that it isn't. However I would say that the inferred evidence from Colorado, Wyoming and Wisconsin suggests that CWD is not a human health concern (i.e. no evidence of an increased incidence of human brain disorders within the CWD "endemic" areas of these states)...

 

TSS states;

 

NEXT, let's have a look at the overall distribution of CWD in Free-Ranging Cervids and see where the CWD cluster in NM WSMR borders TEXAS;

 

Current Distribution of Chronic Wasting Disease in Free-Ranging Cervids

 


 

NOW, the MAP of the Exoregion where the samples were taken to test for CWD;

 

CWD SURVEILLANCE SAMPLE SUBMISSIONS TEXAS

 


 

Ecoregions of TEXAS

 


 

IF you look at the area around the NM WSMR where the CWD cluster was and where it borders TEXAS, that ecoregion is called Trans Pecos region. Seems if my Geography and my Ciphering is correct ;-) that region only tested 55% of it's goal. THE most important area on the MAP and they only test some 96 samples, this in an area that has found some 7 positive animals? NOW if we look at the only other border where these deer from NM could cross the border into TEXAS, this area is called the High Plains ecoregion, and again, we find that the sampling for CWD was pathetic. HERE we find that only 9% of it's goal of CWD sampling was met, only 16 samples were tested from some 175 that were suppose to be sampled.

 

AS i said before;

 

> SADLY, they have not tested enough from the total population to

 

> know if CWD is in Texas or not.

 

BUT now, I will go one step further and state categorically that they are not trying to find it. just the opposite it seems, they are waiting for CWD to find them, as with BSE/TSE in cattle, and it will eventually...

 

snip...end...TSS

 

===============================

 

2005

 

SEE MAP OF CWD ON THE BORDER OF NEW MEXICO VERY CLOSE TO TEXAS ;

 


 


 

 NO update on CWD testing in Texas, New Mexico that i could find. I have inquired about it though, no reply yet...

 

 -------- Original Message --------

 

Subject: CWD testing to date TEXAS ?

 

Date: Mon, 09 May 2005 12:26:20 –0500

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

To: kristen.everett@tpwd.state.tx.us

 

Hello Mrs. Everett,

 

I am most curious about the current status on CWD testing in Texas. could you please tell me what the current and past testing figures are to date and what geographical locations these tests have been in. good bust on the illegal deer trapping case. keep up the good work there.........

 

thank you, with kindest regards,

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 

 -------- Original Message --------

 

Subject: CWD testing in New Mexico

 

Date: Mon, 09 May 2005 14:39:18 –0500

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

To: ispa@state.nm.us

 

Greetings,

 

I am most curious of the current and past CWD testing in New Mexico, and there geographical locations...

 

thank you,

 

Terry S. Singeltary SR. CJD Watch

 

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################

 

2006

 

----- Original Message -----

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET

 

To: BSE-L@aegee.org

 

Sent: Saturday, December 23, 2006 1:47 PM

 

Subject: CWD in New Mexico 35 MILES FROM TEXAS BORDER and low testing sampling figures -- what gives TAHC ???

 

Date: December 23, 2006 at 11:25 am PST

 

Greetings BSE-L members,

 

i never know if i am going crazy or just more of the same BSe. several years ago i brought up the fact to the TAHC that CWD was literally at the Texas borders and that the sample size for cwd testing was no where near enough in the location of that zone bordering NM. well, i just wrote them another letter questioning this again on Dec. 14, 2006 (see below) and showed them two different pdf maps, one referencing this url, which both worked just fine then. since then, i have NOT received a letter from them answering my question, and the url for the map i used as reference is no longer working? i had reference this map several times from the hunter-kill cwd sampling as of 31 August 2005 pdf which NO longer works now??? but here are those figures for that zone bordering NM, for those that were questioning the url. the testing samples elsewhere across Texas where much much more than that figure in the zone bordering NM where CWD has been documented bordering TEXAS, near the White Sands Missile Range. SO, why was the Texas hunter-kill cwd sampling as of 31 August 2005 document removed from the internet??? you know, this reminds me of the infamous TEXAS MAD COW that i documented some 7 or 8 months before USDA et al documented it, when the TAHC accidentally started ramping up for the announcement on there web site, then removed it (see history at bottom). i am not screaming conspiracy here, but confusious is confused again on the ciphering there using for geographical distribution of cwd tissue sample size survey, IF they are serious about finding CWD in TEXAS. common sense would tell you if cwd is 35 miles from the border, you would not run across state and have your larger samples there, and least samples 35 miles from where is what found..........daaa..........TSS

 

THEN NOTICE CWD sample along that border in TEXAS, Three Year Summary of Hunter-Kill CWD sampling as of 31 August 2005 of only 191 samples, then compare to the other sample locations ;

 


 


 

TPWD has been conducting surveys of hunter-kill animals since 2002 and has collected more than 7300 samples (as of 31 August 2005). In total, there have been over 9400 samples, both hunter-kill and private samples, tested in Texas to date, and no positives have been found.

 


 

SO, out of a total of 9,400 samples taken for CWD surveillance in TEXAS since 2002 of both hunter-kill and private kill, ONLY 191 samples have been taken in the most likely place one would find CWD i.e. the border where CWD has been documented at TEXAS and New Mexico

 

latest map NM cwd old data

 


 


 

CWD in New Mexico ;

 

What is the Department doing to prevent the spread of CWD?

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) was recently detected in a mule deer from Unit 34. Until 2005, CWD had only been found in Unit 19. With this discovery, the Department will increase its surveillance of deer and elk harvested in Units 29, 30 and 34.

 

Lymph nodes and/or brain stems from every harvested deer and brain stems from all elk taken in Unit 34 will be sampled.

 

snip...

 


 


 


 


 


 


 

CWD SURVEILLANCE TEXAS

 


 

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

 

2011 – 2012

 

Friday, October 28, 2011

 

CWD Herd Monitoring Program to be Enforced Jan. 2012 TEXAS

 

Greetings TAHC et al,

 

A kind greetings from Bacliff, Texas.

 

In reply to ;

 

Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) Announcement October 27, 2011

 

I kindly submit the following ;

 


 


 

 TEXAS CWD STATUS

 

Captive Cervids

 

There have been no reported CWD infections of captive elk or deer in Texas. There is currently no mandatory surveillance program for susceptible cervids kept on game farms, although, there has been voluntary surveillance since 1999, which requires owners of participating herds to maintain an annual herd inventory and submit samples for all mortalities of animals over 16 months of age.

 

Free-Ranging (Wild) Cervids

 

There have been no reported CWD infections of free-ranging susceptible cervids in Texas. Currently targeted surveillance of free-ranging cervids having clinical symptoms is ongoing in Texas with no positives identified. Additionally, sampling of hunter-killed animals was initiated statewide during the 2002-2003 deer hunting season and sampling will be continued for the next three to five years.

 

Historic Status

 

snip...

 

NO update on CWD testing in Texas, New Mexico that i could find. I have inquired about it though, no reply yet...

 

-------- Original Message --------

 

Subject: CWD testing to date TEXAS ?

 

Date: Mon, 09 May 2005 12:26:20 –0500

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

To: kristen.everett@tpwd.state.tx.us

 

Hello Mrs. Everett,

 

I am most curious about the current status on CWD testing in Texas. could you please tell me what the current and past testing figures are to date and what geographical locations these tests have been in. good bust on the illegal deer trapping case. keep up the good work there.........

 

thank you, with kindest regards,

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 

CJD WATCH

 

-------- Original Message --------

 

Subject: CWD testing in New Mexico

 

Date: Mon, 09 May 2005 14:39:18 –0500

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

To: ispa@state.nm.us

 

Greetings,

 

I am most curious of the current and past CWD testing in New Mexico, and there geographical locations...

 

thank you,

 

Terry S. Singeltary SR. CJD Watch

 

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################

 

-------- Original Message --------

 

Subject: CWD SURVEILLANCE SAMPLE SUBMISSIONS TEXAS ?

 

Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 15:09:58 –0500

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

Greetings List members,

 

as i stated in my previous email;

 


 

> >> CWD has not been detected in Texas, SADLY, they have not tested enough from the total population to know if CWD is in Texas or not. time will tell though. IF they get serious about finding and documenting CWD in sufficient numbers here in TEXAS, sadly, i am afraid they will find it. ITs already at NM, Texas border, TSEs knows no borders. HOWEVER, with the recent finding of a CNS cow with high potential for BSE/TSE in TEXAS, with one high official over ruling another official that wanted it tested, with the high official winning out and the damn thing going to render without being tested, head spinal cord and all. THIS weighs heavy on the credibility of any surveillance for any TSE in TEXAS, and speaks a great deal for the over all surveillance of TSE in the USA...TSS

 

SO, i thought i would just see where these Ecoregions were, and just how the CWD testing was distributed. YOU would think that with the cluster of CWD bordering TEXAS at the WPMR in NM, you would have thought this would be where the major CWD testing samples were to have been taken? wrong! let's have a look at the sample testing. here is map of CWD in NM WPMR bordering TEXAS;

 

NEW MEXICO 7 POSITIVE CWD WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE MAP

 


 

NEXT, let's have a look at the overall distribution of CWD in Free-Ranging Cervids and see where the CWD cluster in NM WSMR borders TEXAS;

 

Current Distribution of Chronic Wasting Disease in Free-Ranging Cervids

 


 

NOW, the MAP of the Exoregion where the samples were taken to test for CWD;

 

CWD SURVEILLANCE SAMPLE SUBMISSIONS TEXAS

 


 

Ecoregions of TEXAS

 


 

IF you look at the area around the NM WSMR where the CWD cluster was and where it borders TEXAS, that ecoregion is called Trans Pecos region. Seems if my Geography and my Ciphering is correct ;-) that region only tested 55% of it's goal. THE most important area on the MAP and they only test some 96 samples, this in an area that has found some 7 positive animals? NOW if we look at the only other border where these deer from NM could cross the border into TEXAS, this area is called the High Plains ecoregion, and again, we find that the sampling for CWD was pathetic. HERE we find that only 9% of it's goal of CWD sampling was met, only 16 samples were tested from some 175 that were suppose to be sampled.

 

AS i said before;

 

> SADLY, they have not tested enough from the total population to > know if CWD is in Texas or not.

 

BUT now, I will go one step further and state categorically that they are not trying to find it. just the opposite it seems, they are waiting for CWD to find them, as with BSE/TSE in cattle, and it will eventually...

 

TSS

 

CWD TEXAS TAHC OLD FILE HISTORY

 

updated from some of my old files. ...

 

Subject: CWD SURVEILLANCE STATISTICS TEXAS (total testing figures less than 50 in two years)

 

Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2002 21:06:49 –0700

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

 

Singeltary trying to warn TAHC that they were covering up mad cow disease and correspondence with OIG

 

 BUT FIRST, THE FIRST STUMBLING AND STAGGERING MAD COW THAT GOT AWAY FROM SINGELTARY, 2004, highly suspect stumbling and staggering mad cow reported, however, NO TESTING DONE, ON ORDERS FROM AUSTIN $

 

 May 4, 2004

 

 Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms

 

 On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

 

 FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

 

 FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

 

 Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison)...

 


 

 USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system (CNS)

 

 According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NHIS) Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2 The memorandum notes that "it is essential that brain specimens be collected from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance of BSE."

 

 The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5

 

 May 13,2004

 

 Page 2

 

 snip...

 

 The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5

 

 This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of whether this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between the number of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows actually tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:

 


 

 -------- Original Message --------

 

 Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease

 

 Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

 

 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

 To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us

 

 Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

 

 snip...

 

 There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

 

 Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx

 

 Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST In

 

 Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:

 

 Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected. just pondering... TSS

 

 MAD COW IN TEXAS NOVEMBER 2004 SINGELTARY’S MAD COW THAT DID NOT GET AWAY, JUST DELAYED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES...TRADE $$$

 

 -------- Original Message --------

 

 Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us

 

 Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

 

 Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600

 

 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

 To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>

 

 Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;

 

 Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

 

 and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???

 

 terry

 

 -------- Original Message --------

 

 Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

 

 Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 –0600

 

 From: Carla Everett

 

 To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>

 

 The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas. Carla At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>

 

 -------- Original Message --------

 

 Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

 

 Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett

 

 To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

 References: ...sniptss

 

 our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something. At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,

 

 you wrote:

 

 >why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?

 

 >>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:

 

 >November 22: Press Release title here

 

 >>star image More BSE information

 

 >>>>terry

 

 >>Carla Everett wrote:

 

 >>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...

 

 >>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>

 

 ==========================

 

 -------- Original Message --------

 

 Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us

 

 Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

 

 Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600

 

 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

 To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>

 

 Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;

 

 Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

 

 and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???

 

 terry

 

 =====7 MONTHS LATER, SINGELTARY’S MAD COW WAS CONFIRMED=====

 


 


 

 HOW TEXAS DOES TRACE OUTS...

 

 Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. ***The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.

 

 snip...

 

 Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as ***untraceable because all leads were exhausted.

 

 Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. ***The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. ***A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. ***With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.

 

 Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. ***Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. ***A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as ***untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.

 

 Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. ***The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. ***The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as ***untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.

 

 Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. ***A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. ***The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.

 


 

 USDA did not test possible mad cows

 

 By Steve Mitchell

 

 United Press International

 

 Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM

 

 WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.

 


 


 

 ""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

 

 THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

 

 THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

 

 TEXAS 2ND MAD COW THAT WAS COVERED UP, AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, AND CALLS FROM TSE PRION SCIENTIST AROUND THE GLOBE, THIS 2ND MAD COW IN TEXAS WAS CONFIRMED

 

 THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP

 

 JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED

 

 OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7 MONTHS LATER

 

 TEXAS MAD COW

 

 THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;

 

 During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.

 


 

Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS.

 

 Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.

 

 This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:

 


 

Owens, Julie

 

 From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

 Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

 

 To: FSIS RegulationsComments

 

 Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

 

 Page 1 of 98

 


 

*** FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY ***

 


 

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

 

 Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed?

 


 

 SEE OUR GOVERNMENT COVER UP OF MAD COW DISEASE IN THE USA ;

 

 Tuesday, August 4, 2015

 

 *** FDA U.S. Measures to Protect Against BSE ***

 



Thursday, August 20, 2015

TEXAS TAHC DEER BREEDER CWD PERMIT RULES EMERGENCY ADOPTION PREAMBLE


 
Thursday, August 20, 2015

TEXAS CAPTIVE Deer Industry, Pens, Breeding, Big Business, Invites Crooks and CWD


 
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/

 

lost my mom to hvCJD 12/14/97 confirmed, and just made a promise to mom, never forget, and never let them forget...

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

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